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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On February 2, 1977, President Jimmy Carter nominated arms control advocate
Paul C. Warnke to the dual posts of director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) and chief negotiator for the Strategic Arms and Limitation Talks II
(SALT II). Warnke's nomination turned into a controversy that sparked a national
debate, passing Senate confirmation for negotiator by only a slim voting margin of 58-40.
Historians and commentators have assumed the controversy and the number of votes
against him was inevitable because of Warnke's reputation. His arms control ideology of
restraint in weapons development and his skeptical view of the political utility of nuclear
weapons seemed to automatically disqualify him as an effective negotiator. Historians
have framed the controversy as part of the post-Vietnam breakdown in the consensus on
the use of military force, as part of a renewed anti-communist campaign by a rising
coalition of neoconservatives, or as part of the efforts by the Committee on the Present
Danger (CPD) to gain support for a defense buildup after a decade of restraint.
Commentators have assigned leadership of the anti-Warnke campaign primarily to
defense-minded Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA) of the Armed Services Committee
(ASC) and to defense strategist Paul Nitze. Some historians have attributed the effort
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against Warnke as an attempt to control SALT II negotiations. The question remains
though why shaping SALT II was so important and what the national debate Warnke's
nomination stirred was fundamentally about.
In answer to that question and against those orthodox interpretations, this paper
proposes a new framework. It argues two central points. First, the nomination was not
inevitable. Warnke's reputation was necessary but not sufficient for the number of votes
against him. Instead, Senator Jackson and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) deliberately
constructed a controversy by questioning Warnke's credibility. Their strategy of
constructing a controversy by holding hearings, with expectation of media coverage, and
Jackson's tactic of creating doubt about Warnke's credibility gained enough votes to
prove that the Senate could block a future treaty that did not fit their criteria.
While the tactic got the media's attention and the vote, it obscured what the team
effort by Senators Jackson and Nunn was really about. When close analysis of the media
response to the nomination, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (FRC) and the ASC
confirmation hearings are combined with analysis of Jackson's methods and motives from
the SALT I (Interim Agreement and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) hearings of 1972 and
Warnke's private papers, a new framework emerges that argues the second point of what
the nomination was fundamentally about. The Warnke nomination pitted two competing
campaigns of strategic thought on how much was enough for a credible deterrent against
each other and marked the turning point toward a new consensus on U.S. declaratory
strategic doctrine. To understand then what motivated the anti-Warnke campaign and
what the debate was really about, one has to first understand strategic doctrine in a
democracy.

2

In 1954, a speech by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the Council on
Foreign Relations implied that U.S. strategic doctrine rested on "massive retaliation"
against Soviet cities, known as "countervalue" and later as "assured destruction" or
mutual assured destruction (MAD), as the sole deterrent.1 Such publically articulated
plans were far from the reality of actual operational planning done by the military, which
created an enduring schism between political and operational assumptions of how much
was enough for a credible deterrent in the nuclear age.2 During the 1960s, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara presided over the schism's deepening division. In 1962, he
declared a "no cities" (counterforce against an adversary's military capabilities) doctrine.
Military strategy, he said, would have to be regarded the same way conventional military
operations were before the nuclear revolution of 1945 seemed to have rendered them
militarily and politically useless. "The destruction of the enemy's military forces, not his
civilian population," was the objective.3 When it became clear that the requirements for
counterforce capabilities were infinite, the budget-minded McNamara publically
repudiated counterforce as U.S. declaratory doctrine and shifted toward one of assured
destruction. As former Pentagon official Morton Halperin remembered, "all officials
have learned to talk in public only about deterrence and city attacks…Too many critics
can make too much trouble (no cities talk weakens deterrence, the argument goes) so

1

Dulles publically repudiated reliance on massive retaliation two years later. Still, the damage was done.
See Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986), 17-18.
2
Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books,
1989), 29.
3
William Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 74-75.
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public officials have run for cover…But the targeting philosophy, the options and the
order of choice remain unchanged."4
McNamara's linguistic legacy profoundly affected domestic politics and strategic
policy for the next half century. Declaratory policy became a marketing tool, a political
instrument to reassure the public and control the defense budget even as operational
planning retained its focus on military targets. 5 The declaratory concepts of "mutual
assured destruction" and other reassuring terms such as "countervalue," (targeting
industry and population centers) "mutual deterrence," "strategic sufficiency," and even
"minimum deterrence" became popularly ingrained in congressional, public, academic,
and even in some defense-minded intellectuals' minds as official U.S. strategic doctrine.6
As public creed and deterrence dogma, MAD became canonized in the minds of nuclear
theorists, arms control advocates, and national consciousness and reified as U.S. strategic
doctrine.7
The reification of the doctrine of assured destruction became codified with the
signing of the Interim Agreement and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in May 1972,
known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). The ABM Treaty limited
missile defenses to 200 interceptors for each side, later changed to 100. The Interim
Agreement froze the number of missile silos (ICBMs) on both sides to levels then
existing or under construction to 1,054 for the United States and 1,607 for the Soviets. It
did not prohibit modernization. It did not lead to agreed definitions for what constituted

4

Morton Halperin, quoted in Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1983), 15.
5
Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, 90.
6
Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, 30.
7
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 323;
Fred Ikle, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last out the Century?,” Foreign Affairs 51 no. 2 (1973), 267-269.
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"significant" increases in the size of missiles, which the Soviets wanted to keep
ambiguous. The terms were to be in place for a period of five years.
Capitol Hill hailed the ABM Treaty, which limited missile defense to a negligible
amount, as evidence that the Soviets understood the logic of mutual deterrence and the
principle of mutual vulnerability. 8 There could be no defense against nuclear weapons,
and cities would always remain vulnerable. The ABM Treaty seemed to have halted the
arms race and provided a finite answer to how much was enough for a credible deterrent.
Some defense intellectuals, like assured destruction and arms control advocate Paul
Warnke, repeated these assumptions in speeches, Senate testimonies, and publications.
Newspapers echoed these thoughts in the pages of the New York Times and the
Washington Post.9 Restraint instead of preparedness became the dominant ideology
driving weapons procurement.
To those less confident in the logic of automatic deterrence, the artificial cap on
U.S. capabilities was driving the United States into an increasingly precarious position
vis-à-vis the Soviets. Under the terms of the Interim Agreement, both sides were free to
modernize their forces. With the agreement allowing the Soviets higher launcher and
missile numbers, numerical inequality and potential superiority became increasingly
significant. Skeptics feared that the Soviets did not embrace a MAD doctrine and were
striving for superiority and a war-fighting capability. As the Soviets continued to expand
within the numerical limits of SALT I, skeptics called for a U.S. response before the
negotiations of SALT II began. Public reliance on assured destruction and arms control
agreements as enough to ensure a credible deterrent was becoming a liability. While
8

Joshua Muravchik, “Expectations of SALT I: Lessons for SALT III,” World Affairs 143 no. 3 (1980/1,
284.
9
Muravchik, 284.
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some were reassured by the seemingly self-evident nuclear logic of "mutual assured
destruction" and the signing of SALT I, by the early 1970s others feared that Soviet
counterforce gains meant the United States was drifting from a position of nuclear
superiority to "essential equivalence" and parity, and eventually to inferiority unless
something was done to reverse the trends.
Defense minded Senators and nuclear strategists feared that without the capability
to respond should deterrence fail, the United States would be vulnerable to nuclear
blackmail, an "impotent giant" in the face of Soviet coercion during a political crisis.10
The dominant school of U.S. strategic thinking on the political non-utility of nuclear
weapons and unilateral restraint in weapons procurement was jeopardizing the U.S.
deterrent. Scenarios of a President being self-deterred from retaliation against a Soviet
first strike during a political crisis because he had only the capability to respond with
attacks on Soviet cities, knowing the Soviets might then counterstrike against the
American people, motivated both fear and pen. As strategist Phillip Bobbit summarized
the perceived dilemma, the "caricature of Assured Destruction as no more than the threat
to employ nuclear weapons against cities and people" would become a "grotesque reality"
without counterforce capabilities against military targets.11 It was this fear that motivated
a defense-minded coalition to call for a counterforce revival in the public sphere.
Fundamental to accomplishing a counterforce crusade was resolving the meaning
of superiority in the nuclear age. In 1974, former SALT I negotiator Paul Nitze told a
10

Richard Pipes, remarks during “Peace with Freedom: A Discussion by the Committee on the Present
Danger Before the Foreign Policy Association,” March 14, 1978, in The Committee on the Present
Danger, “Has America Become Number 2?,” in Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the
Present Danger, ed. Charles Tyroler (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 21.
11
Philip Bobbitt, "Selective Options and Limited Responses, 1974-83, in US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader,
edited by Philip Bobbit, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: New York University
Press, 1989).
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congressional committee that the Soviets were on their way to gaining strategic
superiority.12 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asked in reply, "What in the name of
God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily,
operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"13 The question was
more than rhetorical. If superiority was meaningless, then so were inequalities in
weapons. If it mattered, then the United States was vulnerable and deterrent
requirements were infinite. As military commanders would say, "what the hell is nuclear
restraint?"14 Kissinger called for a national debate following the 1974 Moscow summit
to bring such questions to the public’s attention. Nitze lamented a year later that no such
debate had taken place.15
The need for action took on increasing urgency as the gap between declaratory
doctrine and military capability widened. Nitze warned in 1976 that “the trends in
relative military strength are such that, unless we move promptly to reverse them, the
United States is moving toward a posture of minimum deterrence in which we would be
conceding to the Soviet Union the potential for a military and political victory if
deterrence failed.”16 In the same year, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), of
which Nitze was a founding member,17 published pamphlets warning that "our country is
in a period of danger….unless decisive steps are taken to alert the nation that our military
and economic capacity is becoming inadequate to peace and security." The principle
12

Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, A Memoir (New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1989), 337-341.
13
Henry A. Kissinger, Press Conference before the Intourist Hotel, U.S.S.R, Moscow, Department of State,
Press Release, (July 3, 1974), 4, 10-11.
14
Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal, 80.
15
Paul Nitze, “The Vladivostok Accord and SALT II.” The Review of Politics 37 no. 2 (1975): 147; Nitze,
From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 353.
16
Paul Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente,” Foreign Affairs 54 no. 2 (1976, 227.
17
Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 353; Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of
American Anticommunism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 368-369.
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threat was the "Soviet drive for dominance based on an unprecedented buildup to expand
political and military influence" in the world.18 Failures in weapons acquisition were
leading actual U.S. capability back toward McNamara's assured destruction force. 19
The CPD and other defense-minded intellectuals and Senators feared that the gap
between official doctrine and military capability was moving the United States toward an
incredible posture of minimum deterrence.20 Since Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger's 1974 public announcement of a change in U.S. doctrine to "counterforce,"
the gap had been increasing further.21 The public and many in Congress still thought
assured destruction was enough and the best solution to U.S. vulnerability was arms
control. Correcting the gap and reversing the trends meant changing public strategic
thinking. With the SALT II negotiations pending, the CPD determined to bring that to
pass by facilitating a national discussion, availing itself of all media with the objective of
building a new strategic consensus and support for modernization before SALT II's
ratification. They hoped that once the people saw the bankruptcy of the U.S. deterrent
from their exposure to a national debate on SALT II, the public would give their support
to increasing the defense budget to restore the credibility of the American deterrent.22
Historians have described the SALT II ratification hearings of 1979 as the defense
debate of the decade.23 They have also viewed the CPD as the primary actor in the
18

Paul Nitze, “The 1980 Crisis and What to Do About It,” January 22, 1980, in Alerting America: The
Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, ed. Charles Tyroler (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 196.
19
The Committee on the Present Danger, “Has America Become Number 2?,” in Alerting America: The
Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, ed. Charles Tyroler (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 223.
20
The Committee on the Present Danger, “Has America Become Number 2?,” in Alerting America: The
Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, ed. Charles Tyroler (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), 219.
21
Sverre Lodgaard, “The Functions of SALT,” Journal of Peace Research 14 no. 1 (1977), 12.
22
Charles Tyroler, ed., Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, 5, 20-26,
121, 171-177.
23
Patrick Glynn, Closing Pandora’s Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War
(New York: Basic Books, 1992), 301; Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2000), 358.

8

campaigns to increase the U.S. defense effort during the 1980s.24 In actuality, a
Senatorial call for a national debate by a defense-minded member of the Armed Services
Committee, Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), preceded the CPD's call for action.
Jackson answered Kissinger's question by warning that the "real danger ahead is the
Kremlin's political use of strategic superiority as an umbrella under which to pursue a
series of probes to expand Soviet power and weaken the position of the United States." 25
It was this fear of the Soviet use of superiority and the inadequacy of U.S. forces that
motivated Jackson's deliberate political construction of a controversy in February 1977
when President Carter nominated Paul C. Warnke to the dual posts of SALT II chief
negotiator and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Warnke's reputation as an advocate and spokesman of the school of assured
destruction and unilateral restraint seemed to make the controversy over his nomination
inevitable. Most commentators have explained its controversial status as a product of
Warnke's reputation as an assured destruction and arms control advocate alone.26 Yet the
controversy his nomination provoked was far from foreordained. Warnke's public record
was necessary but not sufficient to turn the hearings into a pre-ratification defense debate.

24

Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of
Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 180-184, 208; Glynn, Opening Pandora's Box, 302; Richard
Gid Powers, Now Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1998), 378-383, 399-410.
25
U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Military implications of the Treaty on the limitation
of strategic offensive arms and protocol thereto (SALT II Treaty): Hearings before the Committee on
Armed Services, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 1st sess., 1979, 413.
26
See Patrick Glynn, Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War
(New York: Basic Books), 301; Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present
Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 208; Robert Gordon Kaufman,
Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 358-359; Richard
Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of Anticommunism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998), 366-368, 373-376; Robert Strong, Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of Foreign
Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2001), 14-15; Duncan L. Clarke, The Politics of Arms
Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (New York: Free
Press, 1979), 4.
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What he stood for, known by all, was indeed the reason Carter nominated him, and
Democrats did not relish directly challenging their new President on policy grounds.
It was Warnke's testimony given in front of the FRC and ASC, wherein the
champion of arms restraint sounded instead like a proponent of preparedness, that
provided the opposing school of thought an opportunity to make the nomination their
battleground not only for shaping SALT II, but for reforming U.S. strategic thought to
prevent the drift toward MAD. Following the advice of his supporters, Warnke defended
his conversion by arguing it was no conversion at all, but a rational adaptation to
changing circumstances. He maintained that his fundamental views were unchanged,
even as his positions on specifics adjusted to new developments. Warnke's consistent
record over eight years suggested otherwise. Thus, it was not only Warnke's past record
that gave cause for doubting his competence. His present repudiation of his past record
and refusal to admit he had changed created doubts about his credibility. The question
dominating headlines turned from the meaning of superiority to who was the real Paul
Warnke?
Amid the brewing storm, President Carter defended his nominee at a press
conference on February 8, 1977, the same day as the FRC hearings, pledging that once all
knew what Warnke stood for, they would vote for him overwhelmingly. 27 As the
political leader of the opposing school of preparedness, Senator Jackson based his
strategy on testing that hypothesis in front of his own Armed Services Committee (ASC).
To gain the desired votes, Jackson created deliberate doubt about the nominee's
27

"A ‘Quick Agreement’ on Arms,” February 10, 1977, Paul C. Warnke papers part 1, Box 36: Folder 2,
Booth Family Center for Special Collections, Georgetown University Library, Washington, D.C. (hereafter
cited as PCWP Part Box: Folder); The American Presidency Project, "The President's News Conference,
February 8, 1977," under News Conferences, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7666 (accessed
July 29, 2016).
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competence and character by claiming Warnke had changed his positions to win
confirmation. Warnke's steadfast refusal to admit he had changed and Jackson's
successful methods in creating doubt about his credibility, rather than Warnke's
reputation alone, was why the nomination was so controversial.
With the team effort of Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and nuclear strategist Paul
Nitze, Jackson's strategy of constructing a controversy through the tactic of creating
doubt about Warnke's credibility demonstrated the inadequacy of assured destruction and
gathered a one-third vote against him for negotiator. In Jackson's eyes, resolving the
meaning of superiority during the hearings would reverse the talk of assured destruction
as enough for a credible deterrent. On the stand, Nunn cajoled Warnke into admitting
that assured destruction was not enough to prevent self-deterrence or the Soviet's political
use of superiority. By blending the meaning of superiority with Warnke's inconsistency,
the team effort discredited both the man and the school he represented for the purpose of
gaining enough votes to signal they had enough to block a future treaty.
The more domestic long-term goal was reeducating the American public.
Conducting hearings on the nomination, with the expectation of newspaper coverage,
would reeducate the public on deterrence theory and force adequacy. Strategically
orchestrated by the use of hearings and headlines, politically constructed through the
deliberate creation of a controversy, and tactically calculated to gain the symbolic onethird vote against Warnke, the anti-Warnke effort was above all motivated to reverse the
public reification of assured destruction before the ratification of SALT II. Jackson's
strategy and tactics demonstrated the inadequacy of assured destruction and signaled the
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White House that the Senate would not ratify any treaty that gave the Soviets a perceived
advantage or restricted the United States to a MAD strategy.
Yet Jackson's political tactics obscured both why the hearings were controversial
and the substance of his motives. The significance of the episode must rest on a
distinction between what the effort was about and its distorting results. The goal was to
educate the public in strategic doctrine, shape SALT II, and build support for
modernization to prevent a drift toward MAD. The media's focus on Warnke's credibility
highlighted Jackson's tactic of creating doubt but obscured what his effort was truly
about. Because of this unintentional outcome, most assumed Warnke’s record alone was
sufficient for a controversy and subsequently did not recognize the team efforts of
Jackson, Nunn, and Nitze in deliberately creating one to win votes. Tactics necessary to
win votes were thus not as conducive to the strategy of reeducating the American people
to the requirements of deterrence and strategic doctrine. The secondary literature has
thus failed to understand what the hearings were about. They were not just about
controlling SALT, but shaping U.S. declaratory doctrine. Not grasping the connection
between the team effort’s construction of a controversy and the reality of U.S. doctrine
distorts the nature of strategy in a democracy and fails to recognize the hearings as the
necessary precursor to the SALT II ratification hearings as the defense debate of the
decade.
Chapter II goes behind the scenes to explain what the anti-Warnke campaign was
all about. It explains the deeper motives driving not only the use of Warnke's hearings as
political leverage, but the philosophical ones about deterrence theory and the Soviet
threat. Alongside Warnke's private papers, it uses the 1972 SALT I hearings to explain
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Jackson's motives and methods to place what happened during the ASC hearings within
the framework of a climactic clash between two competing schools of thought on the
requirements of deterrence. Each school of thought competed for a new consensus on
strategic doctrine. Each sought to educate the public on a new consensus in strategic
thinking to guide doctrine, weapons, and negotiations policy. This chapter prepares the
reader for understanding the rhetoric and the reality of what was happening in the public
sphere, both in newspapers and during the hearings themselves.
Chapter III details what was happening in the public sphere with President
Carter's announcement of Warnke's nomination, the media response, and the aftermath of
the Foreign Relations Committee (FRC) hearings. It argues that the controversy was not
inevitable because of Warnke's "dovish" reputation but was deliberately constructed for
the purpose of gathering the desired one-thirds vote against him. Warnke's testimony,
and Carter's pledge that once all considered what Warnke stood for they would vote for
him overwhelmingly, provided the opposition's tactical shift from doubting Warnke's
effectiveness as negotiator to his credibility as a man.
Chapter IV analyzes the ASC hearings themselves to show how Jackson, Nunn,
and Nitze demonstrated the inadequacy of assured destruction and gathered the desired
votes against his nomination. As the only existing in-depth analysis of the hearings, it
highlights how successful their teamwork was in dramatizing the hearings to create a
controversy and in creating doubt about Warnke's credibility to gather votes. By asking
who was the real Paul Warnke, they answered how much was enough for a credible
deterrent, establishing the criteria for a credible deterrent and a future SALT treaty. The
"comma controversy" during the Senate floor debate on the vote illustrated the tactical
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success of denying confirmation by creating doubt. Analysis of the Senate vote itself
demonstrated that the controversy was always fundamentally about the domestic strategic
debate between assured destruction and counterforce as enough for a credible deterrent.
Chapter V, the conclusion, covers the immediate and long-term aftermath of the
hearings. It explains that what Warnke stood for was never truly in doubt, and that the
tactic was deliberately created to gather votes. It demonstrates the paradoxical success of
achieving the desired votes but obscured the hearings' significance for the team effort's
accomplishment of fomenting a reformation in strategic thinking before the SALT II
ratification debate. Through the successful gathering of a symbolic one-third vote against
Warnke for negotiator, Jackson's and Nunn's teamwork reversed the reification of assured
destruction in the public sphere and set the media stage for the CPD's successful
campaign to build up the U.S. deterrent in the 1980s. The conclusion further explains
how the secondary literature has failed to understand the hearings as the deliberate
construction of a controversy and as a climactic culmination between two competing
schools of strategic thought on strategic doctrine in the public sphere and the
requirements of deterrence in the nuclear age. This paper resurrects Jackson's and Nunn's
success in demonstrating the inadequacy of assured destruction that the tactic of
discrediting Warnke's integrity has obscured in both the media at the time and subsequent
literature since.

14

CHAPTER II

THE TWO SCHOOLS

Understanding what was happening in the public sphere during Paul Warnke's
confirmation hearings requires going behind the scenes, into a decade-long debate
between two competing schools of strategic nuclear thought on the requirements of
deterrence. Understanding the motives and methods of these two competing public
relations campaigns supplies the best framework in which to understand the Warnke
hearings. Close attention to the philosophical background between two schools of
thought and the political motivation behind Senator Henry Jackson's approach to
Warnke's nomination together explain what the anti-Warnke effort was all about. What
happened between SALT I of 1972 and the Armed Services Committee hearings of 1977
explains how and why Jackson's strategy and tactics took on the character of a personal
attack on Warnke's credibility that obscured the underlying debate of which the
controversy was truly about, U.S. strategic doctrine.
British nuclear strategist and strident critic of the U.S. defense community, Colin
Gray, predicted in 1978 that the question of what to do about the growing vulnerability of
U.S. ICBMs (Minuteman) as the Soviets increased their counterforce capabilities would
turn into the debate of the decade. A looming Soviet capability to take out a large
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percentage of U.S. ICBMs, leaving only a capability to retaliate against population and
industries with submarines and bombers, threatened the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.
The consequences for the loss of the only weapons that had counterforce capabilities
within the strategic triad of ICBMs, submarines, and bombers would be "an event so
momentous that its anticipation should be the occasion for a fundamental review of
strategic doctrine."28 The vulnerability of Minuteman intensified an existing debate on
how best to deter the Kremlin's political and military use of nuclear weapons.
A coalition of defense-minded strategists and Senators placed the blame for
Minuteman's increasing vulnerability on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Interim
Agreement (SALT I) signed between President Richard Nixon and Soviet General
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972. One of the treaty's primary negotiators, Paul
Nitze, even resigned from his post over Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's secretive
handling of negotiations through "backchannel" agreements with the Soviet premier,
charging the administration with making concessions to get a deal signed.29 Those
suspected concessions included halting the number of strategic missile launchers
deployed and "under construction" at currently unequal levels, codifying Soviet
superiority in perception if not in reality. The agreement left both sides free to modernize
within the numerical limits. Nitze and others like Jackson feared that with their higher
numbers, in time Soviet "heavies" (high-yield Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs)) could give them a strategic advantage in destructive capacity. This would
potentially give them the capability to knock out a large percentage of U.S. land forces,
28
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the only forces with enough accuracy to retaliate against Soviet military forces. Further,
the Soviets refused to an agreed definition of what a "heavy" missile was or what exactly
"under construction" meant, creating the impression of ambiguous "loopholes" and for
some, a clear and present danger.30 There was a growing counterforce imbalance (the
ability to target another's nuclear forces by a large percentage), and it was not in the
United States' favor.
The Senate ratified the treaty after the Nixon administration promised to build the
Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, and the MX missile and approved the Jackson
Amendment, which required equality in a future treaty. Still, if eager ratification of
SALT I seemed to codify Soviet superiority, the Senate pledged that a second treaty
would receive greater scrutiny. Better yet, it would send instructions with the
negotiators.
The signing of SALT I amplified and politicized the contentious question of the
decade, did superiority matter in the nuclear age? The highly respected defense-minded
Senator Henry Jackson, a Democratic lawyer from Washington, thought it did when he
proposed the "Jackson Amendment" in 1972 before the treaty went to a vote. The
popular amendment passed into law the requirement that any future agreement recognize
the principle of equality and "would not limit the United States to levels of…forces
inferior" to those of the Soviet Union.31 SALT I negotiator Gerard Smith explained in his
memoirs that Jackson blamed the "minimum deterrence orthodoxy" of the unduly
influential "idealistic arms controllers" and the "soft wholly thinkers" of the Arms
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Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for the results of SALT I. 32 Jackson
institutionalized his dissent by convincing Nixon to separate the two posts of director and
negotiator and to "purge" the ACDA by sweeping it of arms controllers and cutting its
resources.33 Paul Warnke, one of those idealistic arms controllers who was more
sanguine about the inequality of a temporary agreement, testified confidently in SALT's
favor by dismissing numerical superiority as a meaningless chimera, a "mindless
numbers game" that had meaning only if we "bad mouth" our own capabilities.34
Advocates on both sides called for a new consensus to meet the threat of Soviet
superiority.35
Increasing Soviet capabilities since the signing of SALT I amplified and
politicized this existing debate between two schools of thought on what constituted
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deterrence in the nuclear age. How each school approached negotiations depended on its
view of the nuclear revolution and the Soviet threat.
One school was essentially known as assured destruction advocates and arms
controllers. For them, the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons made their political
use unthinkable. The nuclear revolution rendered superiority meaningless. The only way
to eliminate the other's deterrent was to completely disarm them, impossible in the
nuclear age. Deterrence was thus mutually assured because even one bomb left over after
a first strike was enough to destroy a society in retaliation. The ability to retaliate with
"unacceptable damage" guaranteed no reasonable leader would risk mutual destruction.36
Therefore, assured destruction was always enough to deter the Soviets, who even if they
had superiority could not use it for political objectives. 37 Since mutual assured
destruction (MAD) was an inescapable fact of nuclear logic, bargaining chips and
military preparedness were only recipes for a dangerous arms race. A few submarines,
with the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the adversary's society, were enough
to deter.38 They opposed counterforce capabilities against military targets because
countervalue capabilities against population and industry was enough to deter any sane
leader. Counterforce capabilities only made their use more thinkable, thus more likely to
be used.39 Faith in the logic of deterrence gave them confidence that restraint and arms
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control agreements rather than preparedness were the best solution to Minuteman's
vulnerability.40 They explained the Soviet buildup as simply a reaction to U.S. actions.
If the American superpower stopped building, so would the Soviets. They seemed to
gain institutional support as MAD and assured destruction became reified in official
public speeches and declared U.S. policy through the 1960s. 41 Unfortunately for them,
they left a window of criticism open by talking of MAD as a strategy and assured
destruction as strategic doctrine rather than a description of their nuclear philosophy.42
The other side along the spectrum sought to reverse this reification of assured
destruction in official declarations and its inhibiting effects on actual U.S. nuclear
capability.43 The Soviet buildup since the Cuban Missile Crisis and SALT I aroused
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fears that the Kremlin was striving for superiority, with the intention to fight and win a
nuclear war in the event deterrence failed. Defense preparedness advocates insisted that
reliance on a cities-only deterrent capability left the President with only the options of
capitulation or annihilation after a Soviet first strike in a crisis. The President would be
self-deterred from retaliating for fear of a return strike against the American people. The
specter of political blackmail instead of nuclear holocaust convinced them that the
counterforce imbalance gave the Soviets a strategic and political edge.44 Assured
destruction in the 1970s was simply no longer credible, the Soviets were striving for
superiority, and eagerness in agreements was a dangerous substitute for a deterrent
capability. The United States needed a strategy based on what to do if deterrence failed-a strategy to fight and win a nuclear war, a strategy of use. For defense advocates, MAD
thinking was dangerous, and preventing a treaty that restricted the United States to such a
capability was their primary goal.
Pending SALT II negotiations politicized these philosophical divisions, and Minuteman's
vulnerability by the mid 1970s gave them visceral urgency. The debate was a domestic civilian
one in the rhetorical public sphere that had little to do with actual military strategy, but the
strategic implications of their opposing positions were significant because declaratory policy
determined budget and weapons policy. Domestically, declaratory policy served as either a
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budget ceiling or a marketing tool. U.S. countervalue and counterforce capabilities depended on
the public mood and congressional funds.45 As the strategic balance shifted in the Soviets' favor,
the meaning of superiority and how much was enough for a credible deterrent took on increasing
urgency, and U.S. declaratory policy of assured destruction became a heated liability.

As the Senatorial representative of the defense preparedness school, Senator
Henry Jackson had been campaigning from inside the Congress to reverse the reification
of assured destruction thinking and prevent the drift toward a MAD capability since at
least 1963.46 Jackson's primary complaint against SALT I was that its vague language
and imprecise definitions gave the Soviets what he called a loophole through which
Soviet heavies could pass.47 With time, accuracy and MIRVs48 added to their numerical
advantage would give them overall superiority. 49 What they would do with that and what
the United States should do in response became his central concern. In that context, he
insisted that SALT II must ensure equality. The Senate, he warned, must "play a full and
equal role in bringing about such a treaty."50 The Soviets were striving for superiority,
and public debates on the threat and the necessary response would help the American
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people understand what constituted a credible deterrent.51 He would do so by holding
hearings on the SALT agreements in his own Armed Services Committee.
The Armed Services Committee hearings for SALT I of 1972 explicitly revealed
Jackson's underlying philosophical and strategic motives obscured during Warnke's
confirmation hearings. His words and actions revealed his objective--a new doctrine to
guide negotiations--and what the Warnke hearings and defense debate were truly about-strategic doctrine in a changing strategic environment.
Fundamental was Jackson's favorite word. The most important overriding
question that was fundamental to the whole debate, he kept repeating, was the
survivability of Minuteman into the 1970s and how the treaty could preserve the
deterrent.52 The problem posed by new Soviet counterforce capabilities was at the "heart
of the controversy," Jackson said. Soviet capability as permitted under SALT I gave
them the potential to destroy ninety-five percent of Minuteman by 1977. Minuteman was
so vulnerable that its destruction by a first strike in a crisis left a President with only what
sea forces could do in retaliation, the destruction of Soviet cities, only then to face a
likely Soviet response of a third strike against U.S. cities using their reserve forces,
wiping out life in North America.53 For Jackson, the survivability of the deterrent meant
that the doctrine guiding negotiations, and the negotiator who led them, were
fundamental to the whole debate. SALT I had left Minuteman vulnerable, and his goal
was to ensure SALT II did not do the same.
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A few exchanges demonstrated how the single-minded urgency of Jackson's style
underlined these substantive issues, exhibited contemporary fears, and illustrated the
divide between the two schools of thought.
With SALT I negotiator Gerard Smith, Jackson sought to demonstrate the
inadequacy of assured destruction to deter the Soviets from political or military use in a
crisis. Jackson had a hard time convincing Smith that present U.S. doctrine was not
enough. Soviet heavies suggested to Jackson they were striving for an ability to knock
out Minuteman on the first blow rather than a "simple doctrine of assured destruction"
based on retaliation. Smith thought one was hard-pressed to find anyone subscribing to
any simple doctrine, and pointed out that the United States had similar capabilities in
accuracy and yield as the Soviets. Jackson carried on that Smith missed the point, that
under SALT I the Soviets retained a first strike capability, which meant that first strike
scenarios were "things that you must think through when you are representing the United
States" at negotiations.54
Thinking the best method to discredit the opposing school was to pose scenarios,
Jackson again invoked one of a President left with the single option of striking Soviet
cities with only submarines left after the land forces were destroyed. Smith countered
that these were military questions of strategic doctrine and targeting, best left to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff rather than a negotiator.55 Jackson defined it instead as a political
judgment and continued that there was a school of thought that held "all we need are a
couple of Polaris submarine boats to deter the Soviet Union." Unmoved, Smith replied
that even in Jackson's scenario the leftover forces would leave a President in "pretty good
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shape to deter that sort of attack."56 While Jackson insisted that a President would be
deterred from retaliating only with Polaris subs, Smith calmly maintained that even the
worst case would not leave the United States impotent. In exasperation, Jackson said,
"No, no. We are postulating that we are right down to the choice…of having all of our
people wiped out if we retaliate." An imperturbable reaction from Smith provoked a
frustrated Jackson to reiterate the point that SALT left Minuteman vulnerable and the
President deterred.57
Jackson's attempt to get Smith to admit the doctrine of assured destruction
inadequate had faltered. There must be a minimum surviving force adequate to deter the
Soviets from using the threat of nuclear blackmail, he said, and a policy built around it.
While Smith reassured Jackson that "those who say all you need is two Polaris boats"
were not in the delegation, Jackson insisted that an explicit statement of just how much
was needed was imperative for planning purposes. Jackson explained that what he was
"trying to bring out here" was there was no way to go into SALT II "without some
guiding basic doctrine."58 Any delegation had to have the right one "to be effective in
SALT negotiations."59
The assumptions of the negotiator on the requirements of deterrence were thus
paramount in the context of how the shift in the strategic balance would influence
Russian behavior in the world. Jackson stated explicitly that he was trying to find out
"what strategic concepts will guide defense policy," how "we approach these
negotiations, on what basis we evaluate the acceptability of an agreement, and what our
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basic defense strategy is."60 An agreed upon criteria for a credible force was imperative
for moving forward. The rationale governing these policies was "fundamental to the
negotiating process" and defense planning. The Senate was "entitled to know" the views
that governed negotiations, because the recommendations of the negotiator were
"founded on certain assumptions about our requirements for a credible strategic force." 61
He was determined that the next one would not represent the opposing school of thought.
Jackson's interactions with Admiral Zumwalt and Dr. William Van Cleave best
illustrated how the political utility of superiority required a change in U.S doctrinal
thinking that he was determined to bring to pass. The problem of what the Soviets would
do if they had superiority drove Jackson to insist once more that a sea-based deterrent
would leave the President self-deterred. Zumwalt said "you are preaching to the choir,"
but noted the larger problem was that "there is not a majority who agree with you and
me" on the specific concern of Minuteman survivability. 62 Dr. Van Cleave agreed that
the specter of the diplomatic use of superiority necessitated a sea change in strategic
thinking. The only way to ensure survivability was "rethinking our attitudes about
defense and about assured destruction."63 Fomenting that revolution of thinking was the
reason for Jackson's relentless emphasis on a vulnerable deterrent that left the Soviets
free to use their growing superiority.
Jackson's efforts in 1972 provided an early answer to Kissinger's 1974 question of
"what in God's name is superiority, what do you do with it at these levels of numbers?"64
The Soviets were out for superiority for the purpose of political blackmail. The sum of
60
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Jackson's efforts was to prevent the caricature of assured destruction, as “no more than
the threat to employ nuclear weapons against cities and people," from becoming a
"grotesque reality."65 In light of this, the new delegation needed a doctrine that guided
negotiations, one that denied the Soviets a usable superiority. With a vulnerable deterrent
and the prospect of Soviet blackmail, the importance in Jackson's mind of the
assumptions of the next negotiator motivated the scope and intensity of his deliberate
campaign to reform American strategic doctrine and attitudes.66
While there was a recognized danger of the caricature of assured destruction
becoming a grotesque reality, a community of arms controllers committed to the old
orthodoxy strove to maintain it as declared U.S. doctrine by changing the terms of the
debate to the "real world" after the nuclear revolution. They had a different answer for
what the Soviets might do with superiority and their own solution for the vulnerability of
Minuteman.
As spokesman for that community, Paul Warnke had been lobbying for over a
decade for arms control as the solution to the problem of deterrence. Warnke's interest
and stake in the outcome of the defense debate is reflected in his vast collection of
articles about U.S. strategic doctrine. The overriding preoccupation of his notes was
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what to do about the opposing school. Yet Warnke was an advocate, not a strategist. His
intellectual convictions can be discerned by combining what and how he read, what he
said in public and to his colleagues, and his activities. From this evidence, the themes
recurrent in his papers over nearly twenty years can be distilled down to one conviction.
There could be no use of nuclear weapons; their purpose was only to deter, because MAD
was an inevitable fact of the nuclear revolution.67 In the nightmare nuclear world,
"madness is divinest sense."68 Even if the Soviets destroyed all U.S. land ICBMs,
Warnke thought that "ten Poseidon subs" would be sufficient to destroy their society. 69
Superiority then was a "chimera," a meaningless quest, since a disarming first strike was
militarily impossible.70 Any doctrine contemplating use, such as counterforce, warfighting, or damage limiting, only made war more feasible, and thus more likely. 71 The
scenarios were thus implausible, for no leader would risk Armageddon for political gain.
From these philosophical convictions Warnke determined that the requirements for
deterrence were stable because nuclear war was unthinkable.72 His advantage as an
advocate was his access to the public and the Congress. His disadvantage would be the
very public record he left behind by the time Carter nominated him for chief SALT II
negotiator.
Warnke and the arms control community he led knew well the fears and
arguments of the rising coalition of Senators and strategists seeking a new orthodoxy in
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response to the shifting balance. In 1970, one member of their community sent Warnke
an article by Paul Roche, "Laird Traps Democrats," suggesting an early tactic for their
own campaign. Roche warned that if "liberals ignore the shift in the balance" and the
development of Soviet heavies and MIRVs they'd be "consigned to oblivion." 73 To avoid
such a fate, they proposed adopting the "liberal realist" Jackson as their "tutor" on how to
respond to the national security challenge.74 Warnke's hand written notes from a meeting
in 1970 showed that they knew that efforts to change current doctrine to "uses other than
deterrence" was their main challenge. On a sheet of sketch paper he asked, "Do we take
on the war-fighting rationale and defeat it? Does 'sufficiency' otherwise lose significance?
Do we want to limit qualitative?"75 The rest of his notes suggest the answer was yes.
They would do so by changing the "terms of debate to the real world," confronting
"worst-case and bargaining chip arguments," and using treaties as the means to "prevent
exploit [sic] superiority."76 The genesis of their public campaign can be found in the
minutes of an Arms Control Summer Study and Planning Session held in 1973.
The arms control community was convinced that MAD was an inevitable fact but
was under attack from the opposing school. All agreed that "nobody has figured a way
out of deterrence" and it was "harder to make the case" for an assured destruction posture
against the "alleged political value" of nuclear weapons. Warnke declared that any
"groping for an escape from MAD" was impossible, for "MAD is inevitable." Their
73
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consensus was that "MAD is here by policy or not," for there was no logical "escape from
MAD."77
Led by Warnke, the group devised a campaign to devalue the political utility of
nuclear weapons by relying on a policy of talking. Asking if "meaningless quantitative
and qualitative differences have political significance," Warnke said, "obviously this is
Jackson's concern." Convinced that "MAD assures neither will use for limited purposes,"
but aware of Jackson's position that "numerical superiority can be translated into political
leverage," Warnke advised adopting a policy of "talking about the 'adequacy' of our
numerically inferior posture." He determined that a public, "realistic appraisal of what
deterrence actually required would undermine this political factor."78 That this
necessitated a change in "hardware" not "semantics," revealed Warnke's preference for
talking over capabilities as an adequate deterrent.79 As for Minuteman's vulnerability, it
was only an "attractive nuisance," a problem solved by treaty, not weapons.80
Committing to an unchanging declaratory doctrine as enough to deter assumed the
sufficiency of rhetoric to influence public and defense opinion. To "contribute to the
evolution of a new consensus" based on an unchanging declaratory doctrine of assured
destruction, arms controllers "should defend a position of finite deterrence."81
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The leverage of defense advocates in the Armed Services Committee was the only
obstacle to creating this "new attitude" about "how much is enough." 82
The next several years witnessed the essence of their campaign's focus on the
political utility of nuclear weapons. Up to 1976, the arms control community had been
working to "make nuclear weapons politically and militarily useless." 83 Through articles,
speeches, and testimony, Warnke supplemented their efforts as spokesman by actively
promoting a "reformation in the way we view nuclear weapons and develop plans for
possible use."84 He approached the "lack of consensus as to the inutility of nuclear
weapons" by focusing on two themes.85 The first was warning of the impending
holocaust if ever used, and the second was attempting to delegitimize their perceptual
value in the strategic balance. Any apparent superiority had "political consequence only
if we concede a meaning they otherwise lack."86 Minuteman's vulnerability and any
"perceived inequalities" could be "erased entirely by simple statements of well founded
confidence in the validity of the American strategic deterrent." 87 The strategy of rhetoric
reflected their conviction that a policy of declaring assured destruction would be enough
to deter any use.
Further stemming the tides of change necessitated addressing the Soviet threat.
They recognized the problem of U.S. ICBM vulnerability, but thought the Russian threat
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was exaggerated. Warnke sketched on notebook paper that the true danger was "if we
irresponsibly overestimate the threat…in terms of the nature of our public debate on
defense and the nature of the balance."88 Warnke wrote Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1976 that
"actual use of Soviet military power is hard to find, and they gained no benefit of
"international influence" by their new military strength."89 Fellow arms controller
B.T. Feld published articles assuring that mutual deterrence "will continue in affect
barring madness" and asking what then was "the fuss all about?" and "why the campaigns
to 'wake up America?' by groups and individuals alike?"90 Advised by Warnke, Senator
Hubert Humphrey gave speeches declaring that the scenarios of destroying Minuteman
were "fanciful," and hysteria would only bring the specter of blackmail into being. 91 The
arms controllers had thus stood their ground against cries of a Soviet drive for superiority
from media, Senators, and organizations alike. Their own answer to Kissinger's question
of what do you do with superiority could be summed up in one word: nothing. A
doctrine of assured destruction was always enough.
Thus, while Jackson was determined to prevent the caricature of a drift toward
MAD becoming reality, Warnke campaigned to convince the world that the caricature of
MAD was actually the only reality there was. There was nothing to fear from the
changing balance, or from Soviet superiority, because MAD was here by policy or not. 92
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It was the opposing school's goal to prevent MAD from becoming reality even as the
arms controllers insisted it was the only reality there was in the nuclear world.

on American sources for information on the balance. That they did so illustrated why political perceptions
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CHAPTER III

THE NOMINATION AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARINGS

When President Jimmy Carter nominated the superiority-skeptic and restraint
advocate Paul Warnke to the dual posts of chief SALT II negotiator and director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in early February 1977, a controversy
seemed inevitable and a defense debate assured. Most commentators assumed Warnke's
reputation alone turned the nomination into a national controversy. 93 Yet if the
nomination was going to serve as a forum for inaugurating a national defense debate
before the ratification hearings of SALT II, Warnke's reputation alone was insufficient.
As Warnke and Carter were ideologically aligned in philosophy and goals, Warnke's
reputation was why Carter chose him. Without a concerted effort by Warnke's doubters
to challenge his being approved as negotiator, it was clear that he would pass the Foreign
Relations Committee uneventfully. What the opposition needed was a tactic to get at
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least one-third of the Senate to deny him the role of negotiator, proving it had enough
votes to derail ratification of a Warnke-negotiated treaty. Warnke's testimony, and
Carter's press conference in his defense, provided the tactic that Senator Jackson (D-WA)
of the Armed Services Committee (ASC) seized upon as the means to gain the desired
votes against Warnke without directly challenging the new Democratic president. Media
coverage was central to Jackson's strategy of reeducating the public on the requirements
of deterrence. Yet as news coverage shifted from Warnke's past record to his present
character, the question dominating headlines in February 1977 turned from the meaning
of superiority to who was the real Paul Warnke. The media's shift in focus from
questioning Warnke's effectiveness as negotiator before the FRC hearings, to what
Warnke really stood for after the hearings, successfully constructed the controversy that
would inaugurate a national defense debate in anticipation of the ASC hearings on
Warnke's confirmation held by Senators Jackson and Sam Nunn (D-GA).
Carter campaigned on a platform of a defense capability second to none and the
elimination of nuclear weapons.94 In interviews he favored "rough equivalency," doubted
the need for numerical equality in missiles, and discouraged bargaining chips (weapons
programs as leverage in negotiations). The reality of nuclear destructive capacities made
considerations of whether one nation had a slight advantage over the other irrelevant.
Carter said that once nuclear weapons were used, all-out war was likely, and the
possibility of limited nuclear war was slim.95 The Washington Post leaked a report
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commissioned by Carter asking the Pentagon what constituted a minimum deterrent.
Two hundred missiles launched from just a few nuclear submarines were quite enough. 96
Paul Warnke had been publically advocating for turning such convictions into
policy for years. He testified after the signing of SALT I in 1972 that the logic inherent
in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which precluded substantial missile defenses,
ensured that any surviving forces would always be sufficient "totally to devastate the
attacker's side."97 Under such circumstances, "the continuation of the missile numbers
game is in fact a mindless exercise, that there is no purpose to either side achieving a
numerical superiority, which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability
or any sort of political potential."98 There was no possibility of either side achieving "any
sort of meaningful advantage in the strategic weapons field unless the other side was
willing to concede that advantage." Superiority had meaning only if one said it did.99 In
a debate on how much was enough with then-Senator James Buckley (R-NY) in 1972,
Warnke famously said that "even substantial nuclear superiority short of nuclear
monopoly could not be a decisive factor in any political confrontation between the United
States and Soviet Union."100 In a 1974 article he argued that an "assured second strike
capability--the secure forces that, even after a Soviet first strike, would be capable of
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devastating Soviet society," was enough to prevent nuclear war.101 When Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger announced a public change in targeting policy toward
counterforce in 1974, Warnke published a counterproposal in 1975 in Foreign Policy
replacing counterforce and bargaining chips with sufficiency and restraint called "Apes
on a Treadmill" that summarized his convictions in print. He wrote that there was no
need to be number one because a numerical lead was only politically significant if "we
act as if it matters," conceding it a meaning it "would otherwise lack." With confident
assurance that there was nothing to fear from the Soviet buildup because strategic forces
were "not translatable into political currency,"102 he proposed a policy of restraint with
hopes of reciprocation from the Russians. They were after all only following their only
superpower model, the United States, in what he called a "'monkey see, monkey do
phenomenon" of aping.103
Warnke hoped his public reputation would earn him a spot in the new
administration. On July 29, 1976, he wrote the hopeful President-elect a letter assuring
him that the balance was stable and the U.S. retaliatory capability was assured.
"Discussions of defense problems may often find us spinning mushroom clouds on a head
of a pin," but realistic appraisals of U.S. defense needs showed the defense budget simply
too high, and Nitze's scenarios of a Soviet first strike eroding U.S. ICBMs and bombers
and leaving only impotent subs simply unlikely.104 Carter was intrigued.105 When Carter
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was making his picks for administration posts, it was understood that for fear of
alienating defense hawks he might be hesitant to align too closely with either "liberal
Senators" or the "vocal arms control community." 106 Carter thus passed Warnke over for
Secretary of Defense but thought him ideal for chief negotiator and director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
Through mid-February, Warnke turned the new president down.107 Warnke
expressed thanks for the president's willingness to "work with me in ACDA," but "after
much thought, however, I have concluded that it is not feasible for me to accept an
appointment at this time and I have therefore asked that my name be withdrawn from
consideration. Perhaps later on in the administration I may find that my personal
situation and an attractive offer coincide." In that event, he would be thrilled.108
Desperate after being turned down after a second plea, Carter called him into the
Oval Office and made a third offer. By late February Warnke reportedly "relented on the
condition that he would stay on the job only for a short time, just long enough to get the
negotiations with the Russians over the hump,"109 and after Carter gave him assurance
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that "he would play a central" and pivotal role in the negotiations.110 That was precisely
what his critics and SALT skeptics feared.
Warnke drew fire even before Carter publically announced his name on February
2, 1977. Rumors by the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) that Warnke was a
"paid Russian agent"111 and circulation of an anonymous memorandum charging Warnke
with advocating "unilateral abandonment…of every weapons system which is subject to
negotiation," characterized the tactics of the far-right coalition against him.112
Within the more sedate Congress, Senator Nunn was the first to publically raise
his voice in objection in an open session of an Armed Services Committee on February 1.
Known for having attracted attention from the media with his warnings about the
declining American advantage, Nunn said "I would have no question about Mr. Warnke's
intelligence or integrity but I do have questions about his viewpoints.” 113 He was most
alarmed by Warnke's statement in the Buckley debate that "even substantial nuclear
superiority short of nuclear monopoly could not be a decisive factor in any political
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union."114 Senator Frank Church
(D-ID) defended Warnke's 1972 remarks as falsely "being treated as some radically new
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and extremely dubious doctrine rather than a succinct expression of what has been
conventional wisdom since the dawning of the nuclear age."115
While nuclear liberals were ready to confirm Warnke, Nunn warned that "I don't
think a Warnke nomination is going to breeze through" and intended to make their voices
heard on the floor of the Senate, where Warnke's "confirmation was unlikely to be
unanimous. "116 Nunn declared himself undecided on how he would vote, content to give
advance notice that Warnke's appointment would "not sail through the Senate."117 He
ensured this by summoning Warnke before the "more martial atmosphere" of the Armed
Services Committee for questioning.118 He said on February 2 that the "Nation will be
well served by a thorough examination" of Warnke's positions on weapons and the
"attitudes that he will carry with him to the crucial SALT negotiations." He would give
Warnke full opportunity to explain "whether or not opinions have changed or there are
changed circumstances," welcoming an examination of "some of the crucial questions
that do confront the SALT II negotiators" that would "follow once the nomination is
forwarded to the Senate."119
Senator Jackson joined Nunn in inviting Warnke to testify in front of the Armed
Services Committee. By February 3, Jackson told the press "I want the facts. I'm
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disturbed by some of the positions and recommendations made by Warnke." 120 Nunn and
Jackson both dissociated themselves publically from the rumors and memorandum in
favor of declaring themselves undecided on how they would vote. Jackson's aides
described him as "agnostic but concerned."121 Newspapers may have been perplexed by
Jackson's neutrality, but as Jackson's biographer described, it was typical of Jackson's
strategy to withhold judgment in anticipation of holding his own hearings for the public
record.122 He and Nunn deliberately maintained a publically agnostic position while the
far right kept the media fires burning in anticipation of the ASC hearings.
It may not have sounded like all-out war by February 5, but the atmosphere was
thick with insinuating imagery.123 The Arizona Republic vividly described the scene
descending on Warnke as "like a wall of downfield tacklers forming to smother a punt
return runner."124 If anything was in doubt during the early opposition, it was Warnke's
devotion to Carter's pledge of a defense capability second to none. Warnke's past public
record provided ample evidence of an apparent contradiction between Carter's campaign
pledges and Warnke's "highly advertized positions."125 A "menace to the country" to
some and a "victim of senatorial mugging" to others, Warnke's nomination polarized both

120

Bernard Gwertzman, “Choice of Arms Aide is Facing Opposition: Warnke Nominated by Carter –
Senate Fight Expected,” New York Times, February 3, 1977, PCWP1 23:7.
121
Mary McGrory, “Selection of Warnke Ruffles the Hawks,” PCWP1 36:2; Lee Lescaze, “Warnke
Confirmation Seen Virtually Certain Despite Critics,” Washington Post, February 6, 1977, PCWP1 36:2.
122
Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics, 150.
123
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “A ‘Full-Fledged Battle’ Over Paul Warnke?”, Washington Post,
February 3, 1977, PCWP1 23:7.
124
"Another nominee in trouble,” Arizona Republic, February 6, 1977, PCWP1 36:2.
125
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "A Full-Fledged Battle Over Paul Warnke?", Washington Post,
February 3, 1977, PCWP1 23:7; “Warnke Another Bad Choice,” St. Louis Globe-Democrat, February 7,
1977, PCWP1 36:2; Mark R. Arnold, “Arms and the Man: The Issue Isn't Just Paul Warnke,” PCWP1 36:2.

41

correspondents and makers of policy as the public sphere erupted in a richly imaginative
word war.126
Even as the clamor took on the aspect of a pre-ratification battle, absent a surprise
Warnke would be the expected negotiator. The confirmation seemed "virtually certain
despite critics," as one headline predicted and Democratic Senators like Robert Byrd
(D-WV) conceded.127 The Washington Post speculated that if "senators like Henry
Jackson, Sam Nunn, and Strom Thurmond (R-SC) choose to mount a major challenge to
Warnke," it would "provide the first major debate in the administration on U.S. strategic
policy."128 If the opposition wished to make Warnke's nomination the battleground or
gain a sizable number of votes against him, they needed stronger grounds than Warnke's
reputation alone.

The Foreign Relations Committee Hearings
In his memoirs, arms controller Thomas Graham said that he "had a hand in
Warnke's opening statement and tried to persuade him to back away somewhat from his
previous positions on weapons systems" and the views he had expressed in "Apes on a
Treadmill."129 Warnke was willing to be more "conservative and centrist" in his views
but "wanted to argue that these views were consistent with his past." Graham thought
that a "better course would be to admit they were different" and say one's views as a
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private citizen naturally became less extreme once within government, but "my argument
did not prevail."130 The decision would be a fateful one.
Anticipating criticism and surprising all, Warnke opened with what can only be
called audacious charm. "I would like to make it very clear…that I do not have any
preconceived position with respect to the arms control field, that I approach this with an
open mind."131 He claimed he had always been "prepared to change my mind as further
facts developed," and if found mistaken would feel "perfectly free to admit it." 132 If
anyone thought that he represented a "fixed philosophical position…some of them will be
surprised, and some others will be disappointed."133 He implored them to "recognize that
I have been out of government for the past eight years" and "know nothing except what I
read in the papers."134 To many, Warnke's own public record seemed to suggest
otherwise.
The news as a source of information on that public record elicited many of the
initial questions. Charges of opposing all weapons systems subject to negotiations from
the anonymous memorandum, quotes from Warnke's debate with Buckley about no sane
President using nuclear weapons for political gain, and questions about his supposed
proposal of unilateral disarmament from "Apes on a Treadmill" were the main subjects of
inquiry. Warnke qualified each of these by stating circumstances had changed since
1972, which warranted shifting analyses on each point. He maintained, though, that he
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did not mean by the Buckley debate statement that "we could safely yield strategic
superiority to the Soviet Union."135
SALT I and U.S. strategic doctrine dominated concerns from Warnke's two main
FRC opponents, Senator Robert Griffin (R-MI) and Senator John Danforth (R-MO).
Griffin was disturbed by Warnke's new concern about numerical inequality and the size
of the missiles permitted under the SALT I limits. He quoted Warnke's statement in 1972
that "there is no purpose to either side of achieving a numerical superiority which is not
translatable…into any political potential."136 Warnke reconciled the difference by saying
that Soviet improvements since 1972 in throw weight and accuracy have made the
numerical imbalance significant.137 Just as skeptical that Warnke had reformed
overnight, Senator Danforth quoted Warnke's statement that the more "we do in the way
of modernization of nuclear forces" to increase survivability of ICBMs only meant the
"more chance we will end up" without an agreement.138 In those circumstances,
Danforth feared Warnke was leading the United States into a situation in which when
faced with a conflict with the Soviets, "the only response available to us will be a massive
nuclear war and which urban populations will be targets."139
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) tried to pin Warnke down on a doctrine in which
such a feared scenario would become a reality. "You have spoken many times about the
need to reach a position of minimum deterrence…what size arsenal would you consider
to be minimally appropriate?" Warnke denied having ever said as such and endorsed the
ability to use nuclear forces on a "less than all-out basis. So I don't accept the doctrine of
135
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minimum deterrence."140 Hatch then asked what Warnke thought of the Jackson
Amendment. Warnke said equality, in a permanent agreement, was the principle and law
he would uphold.141 In light of these contradictions, Danforth thought it was time for a
good debate, because the "worst thing that could happen would be for Mr. Warnke to
negotiate a treaty and then have that treaty defeated by the Senate." 142
Just as the first day of hearings was ending on February 8, President Carter gave a
press conference in defense of his chosen nominee. Only a few days before the hearings,
he had responded to questions about Warnke's suitability by affirming him as the "best
man in the country for the job" and that his confirmation was "crucial to his
administration."143 He would stick by his choice. Having been turned down twice,
Carter explained that he was unsuccessful in finding anyone else who was "as wellqualified as he is who would express my views." Having "met with him several times to
discuss his attitude on disarmament matters," Carter said "I know Warnke very well," his
"views are well considered by me. I have accepted them." He had firm assurance that
Warnke's "proposals are sound. I have no concern about his attitude," and "I have
complete confidence in him."144 Carter pledged that "I think when members of the
Senate consider what Mr. Warnke stands for, he will be approved overwhelmingly." 145
Media observers thought that on the face of it, it seemed that the Senate had "little choice
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but to confirm…unless it develops during the confirmation hearings that his views are
seriously out of line with those aired by Carter." The only alternative might have been to
"challenge the premises which led the President to pick him in the first place. This could
turn the confirmation issue into a full-scale debate on defense policy."146
That was precisely what happened. Warnke's surprising hard line, and Carter's
pledge that once the Senate considered what Warnke stood for they would approve him
overwhelmingly, provided challengeable premises on which to mount a controversy and
turn the nomination into a battleground.
Paul Nitze had been searching for such a battleground to stimulate public
awareness of the impending danger of a Soviet nuclear advantage. After learning that his
friend Senator Jackson planned not to do anything to oppose the nomination, he "brooded
over the problem and wrote a letter" to Chairman John Sparkman (D-AL) of the FRC on
February 7.147 In the letter, Nitze said he was concerned that Warnke, who had "spoken
with such certainty on matters of military requirements, weapons capabilities, and
strategy, may nevertheless not be a qualified student or competent judge" on such
matters, and opposed him just for negotiator.148 He broadened his opposition to both
posts after hearing Warnke's testimony. He based his reasoning on Warnke's change of
mind. "I had thought up to that time he did in fact really believe in the various positions
that he took" from 1969-1976.149 Having originally opposed Warnke for being too
certain, he now opposed him for being too flexible. On trial now was what Warnke really
believed and who Carter thought he had nominated.
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Nitze based his judgment on Warnke's changing definition of superiority and
suspect capabilities as an advocate. In the FRC hearings, Warnke had said he would not
cede the reality or appearance of superiority, but the question was "by what change of
logic does he come to that?" If it was the "very odd definition of superiority" as not
possible "unless you have the counterforce capability to almost entirely eliminate the
retaliatory forces of the other side," and the defenses to deal with a counterstrike, such a
definition was completely "arbitrary."150 Nitze did not "believe [Warnke] understands
anything about this, nor do I think he is being honest or consistent in saying what his
views are."151 Nitze went on to describe Warnke's position on bargaining chips as
"absolutely asinine" and his arms control viewpoints as "screwball, arbitrary, [and]
fictitious." Nitze asked, were those the "kinds of capability of advocacy that you want?"
From his perspective, such lack of logic and consistency did not inspire high confidence
in a pending negotiator or a future treaty.152
Nitze's objections synthesized the philosophy of nuclear war with the politics of
treaties. Warnke's view of nuclear war as unthinkable made him comfortable
recommending budget and weapons cuts.153 The danger posed by Warnke's school of
thought in control of negotiations incited Nitze to clarify that "what I really object to
here" is that the certainty in which he spoke should "only come from somebody who
knows what he is talking about." Nitze warned that the rejection of a treaty would be a
tragedy. In light of that, it was "very important that the debate on these issues takes place
prior to the negotiations." There was no other way for the President to know what to
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expect come ratification. He was determined that the issues were "to be debated
concurrently with the man."154

The Interim
Newspapers were the perfect vehicle for generating such a national debate. In the
interim between the FRC and Armed Services Committee (ASC) hearings, headlines
reverberated with questions and commentaries on the implications of Warnke's
nomination. For some the anti-Warnke cabal was an obviously staged preview of treaty
deliberations, and antagonists were only pretending to see Warnke's flexibility as a
"critical flaw in a negotiator" rather than take comfort that he was not an "uncommonly
stubborn man" unwilling to "change his views on the metaphysical issues" in nuclear
warfare.155 Many observers shared Nitze's unbelief that "overnight Warnke has
reformed."156 Claims of Warnke's "characteristic charm and verbal agility" during the
FRC hearings did not easily deflect what became the primary focus on how, why, and
when Warnke must have changed his mind.157 Did he believe in unilateral restraint or
not? Did he now support the B-1 bomber and the Trident he had only last month
opposed? The "fuzziness of understanding" on the new negotiator's precise views meant
that a "long intense and substantial debate is in order," just as the cluster of "anti-Warnke
hardliners" had collaborated to accomplish.158
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Behind the scenes, a friend wrote the beleaguered candidate a personal note of
congratulations for the FRC hearings going so "well for you," and was sure that Warnke
would "surmount the other hurdles" awaiting him in the ASC. As for the attention Nitze
received in the press, his friend suggested that the deprecating remarks "seemed so
intemperate as to suggest even that he is motivated by personal animus." 159
An editorial gave the private suggestion public exposure when Anthony Lewis of
the New York Times inveighed that "there is an almost venomous intensity…a feeling
beyond usual policy disagreement in a democracy." It was as if the "opponents have
made him a symbol of something they dislike so much they want to destroy him." 160 The
intensity reflected a "policy disagreement so fundamental that any imaginable arms
limitation agreement will face powerful resistance." Lewis attributed the rise of a new
"military-intellectual complex" to those supporting a larger defense budget and intense
suspicions of the Kremlin. That Warnke shared Carter's views on the dangers of the arms
race was "doubtless what so greatly agitates critics."161 Lewis was attuned to the
intensity of the immediate politics, if not the underlying fundamentals of nuclear
philosophy motivating the effort to make Warnke's nomination the battleground.
Warnke's reputation as a "super-dove" and his changes of mind provoked "fowl"
language on both sides. While the Pink Sheet on the Left characterized Carter's choice as
"putting the fox in charge of the henhouse," another organization argued that Warnke
"may be characterized as neither hawk nor dove but as a very wise owl." 162 Time was
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little disturbed that Warnke "took pains to toughen up his image" in their article entitled,
"A Proper Perch for a Dove," but the Salt Lake City Tribune was as disturbed as Senator
Hatch, who asked "Why does he want this job so badly that he would reverse his stance
on these issues? That's what worries me."163 With doves descending down on Warnke for
his revised views, a cartoon published in the New York Daily News on February 11 by
Warren King embodied the hope that his supporters would lose confidence in his
commitment as an arms control advocate:

Warren King, New York Daily News, February 11, 1977

As the doves and hawks ruffled their feathers over the fundamentals of defense,
the central question fomenting the debate reached national headline proportions in the
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Chicago Tribune's "Which is the real Paul Warnke?"164 The "disturbing divergence of
opinion" on Warnke's qualifications between Carter and Nitze prodded wondering "how
can two person's views of the same man differ so radically?" 165 Nitze's opinions on
Warnke's competency to judge and his lack of consistency compelled two conclusions in
concert with anti-Warnke hardliners. First, Warnke had "written irresponsibly on
strategic arms control." Second, "now that Warnke has virtually repudiated those
writings," he showed he could "not be trusted to do what he said."166 The question of
who was the real Paul Warnke dominated headlines as the Armed Services Committee
hearings neared.
Before Warnke could deal with the crafty Russians, he had to pass his domestic
challengers from the Armed Services Committee, as Herbert Lawrence Block's political
imagination captured well in his political cartoon of February 14. This time it was an
army of "anti-arms control senators" mounted on a canon, rather than a flock of doves
wielding olive branches, that descended on Warnke with binoculars and battle gear in
hand to inspect Carter's choice as the new negotiator. The headline caption, "the other
part of the job is trying to deal with the Russians," indicated it was less the Kremlin than
the Congress which would be his toughest challenge:
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Herbert Lawrence Block, February 14, 1977

As the grounds for opposition shifted from doubts about Warnke's effectiveness as
negotiator before the FRC hearings to the credibility of his fluctuating convictions after
the hearings, by late February media coverage in anticipation of the ASC hearings had
successfully shifted the focus of the debate from the meaning of superiority to who was
the real Paul Warnke.
Warnke was well aware of the rising tide against him. Interviewed by a reporter
on how he felt when the President said he was the best qualified for the task, Warnke
humbly replied that he was "highly flattered but not entirely convinced." Asked how he
felt about the news coverage, he quipped that he "thoroughly enjoyed all favorable
articles and editorial comments. Resent deeply anything which is at all critical." He
preferred the controversy in contrast to its being ignored, and he felt on balance that it
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"underscored the importance of the issues" and of "arms control as the central factor… in
world peace."167
Privately though, Warnke wondered what motivated the extent and intensity of
the campaign. Two handwritten notes of his preparatory material partially explain the
course and outcome of the hearings. The first was a list of arguments against his
positions, citing Nitze's concern for throw weight. The question at the end of the list,
"Why Jackson Effort?", suggested that though he expected opposition, he did not expect
the nature of their attack. The second note was from a friend who provided an answer.
Bill Jackson wrote Warnke a one page note just prior to the hearings warning him to
"watch out for two traps." The first trap was "getting into specifics of weapons systems."
The second was "above all, don't appear to retreat from your fundamentally same
positions in favor of arms control and checking the rise in expense expenditures. You
weaken your position by over rationalization, or admitting to rethinking so many
positions." Lastly, he told Warnke to insist he be "permitted to answer fully the questions
posed. There is no such thing as a constructive dialogue with Scoop on these matters.
He wants to dictate the terms of SALT." 168 Indeed, that summed up the political thrust of
Jackson's efforts.
As seen in the hearings conducted during SALT I, Jackson historically had used
hearings as a way to influence treaty negotiations. Both disarmament advocate Thomas
Graham and historian Robert Strong thought that Jackson "seized on this controversy to
turn the Warnke nomination into a full-scale debate on strategic policy, as well as a
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referendum on SALT II" when Nitze's testimony guaranteed an open battle.169 Jackson's
biographer Robert Kaufman described his strategy more accurately as a calculated one
from the beginning. As seen since SALT I, his strategy was not to oppose treaties
outright since they were expected to pass. Instead, he took advantage of the ratification
process by holding separate hearings with expectation of media coverage to alert the
American people to the Soviet threat and toughen treaty provisions. 170 He would do the
same with the Warnke nomination. He would not oppose his confirmation outright, but
would instead use it to shape both SALT II negotiations and U.S. strategic thinking.
Jackson also had more directly personal methods should his public efforts fail.
Sensitive to senatorial concerns, Carter agreed to meet with Jackson over breakfast at the
White House on February 4, 1977. 171 Just a week after the FRC hearings on February 15,
Jackson followed up with what became known as the Perle-Jackson memorandum,
detailing guidelines for SALT II. In summary, it said that SALT II must not confer an
exploitable advantage to the Soviets, and it must reduce the threat to Minuteman's
survivability by eliminating the Soviet advantage in heavies, which it insisted had to be
precisely defined. The memorandum counseled against repeating the negotiating tactics
of SALT I. 172 It also implied that the negotiator's skill and ability to bring about such an
outcome was of the utmost importance, and suggested that any future treaty would be
subjected to close scrutiny.
If Warnke was at one time surprised by the extent of Jackson's efforts, an
undelivered draft of Warnke's opening statement for the ASC hearings demonstrated that
169
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he quickly became aware of its motivating force. The draft is worth reviewing to show
how he deliberately qualified his convictions in public while he was privately irked by
the politicking. Similar to his FRC defense that circumstances rather than he had
changed, he blamed the dynamic nature of strategic relations for affecting the merits of
time-bound arms control proposals. Since 1972, Soviet modernization and development
of MIRV missiles meant that "unless action is taken through arms limitation--this
modernized force will eventually gain the capacity, at least on paper, as the Committee
knows, to destroy rather high fractions of our land-based force" [emphasis added]. The
United States had a similar capability, he said, "on paper at least, to destroy high fractions
of the Soviet land-based missile force." But "these are, of course, paper and pencil
calculations with many operational uncertainties…nevertheless, it is clearly disturbing to
military planners on both sides that these calculations posed a threat to U.S. ICBMs." 173
The emphasis on pencil and paper threats suggested unabashed disbelief in the threat of
Soviet political or military use of nuclear weapons. Warnke's edits, by crossing out
words and rewriting in the margins, also suggested a man inordinately cautious in his
diction and self-conscious about revealing his convictions.
Warnke thought the issue should have been resolved by acknowledging the
negotiator's limited role in treaty provisions. He recognized that "many members of this
committee may wish to interrogate me on the question of arms control philosophy….but
general principles do not…decide concrete cases." Proposals rested on consensus among
the executive branch, which "require decisions on what criteria we are to use to determine
the adequacy of our forces." No negotiator or director on his own could determine those
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assessments, nor what those criteria should be.174 For Jackson, that was the whole point.
As Jackson had exclaimed in 1972 in his dialogues with Gerard Smith, the assumptions
of the negotiator on the requirements of deterrence were crucial, and he was determined
to prevent the opposing school representing the United States at SALT II. 175 Warnke and
Jackson then were at loggerheads, and Warnke knew it.
Warnke then turned in the draft to the pending vote on his confirmation. He tried
to spin the controversy over his nomination by arguing that such intensity of interest
would send a signal to the Soviets that Congress would "not settle for just any
agreement" and would get "the closest assessment when the Treaty is brought back." He
warned that he would not "encourage senators to vote against me to straighten that
impression of Senate vigilance." Warnke wrote in draft form what he did not say in
public: "with all due respect, therefore, Senators should not feel that they must decide
today upon the basis of my personality and character, and writings, whether they would
probably like the Treaty which the Executive Branch would negotiate through me, and
then vote accordingly on the basis of that speculation."176 Of course, that was exactly the
way the Senate would scrutinize his suitability.
The differences in Warnke's undelivered draft and delivered remarks he would
give in front of the ASC showed that Warnke knew that the substance of his views and
the integrity of his character were the motivating factors behind the Jackson effort. His
marginal and in-text corrections of the draft he eventually delivered illustrated the lengths
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he would go in order to avoid certain connotations or a patronizing tone, and to recast
past positions as being more flexible than his actual convictions. He closed the draft
with, "there is no question but that the United States must be second to none in military
power, but, hopefully, if arms control policies are successful, at lower levels of cost and
destructive potential." In his edits, Warnke replaced "second to none" with "have
sufficient military power to deter aggression."177 Privately then, he never wavered from
his conviction that superiority was simply not possible and sufficiency was the only
alternative, just as he had publically campaigned for years.
During the ASC hearings, Warnke's strict adherence to Bill Jackson's advice
provided Senator Jackson an effortless strategy for discrediting both the man, and
through the team efforts of Senator Nunn and strategist Paul Nitze, the school of thought
he represented. An extensive examination of the consistency of Warnke's public record
in contrast to his present positions would prove his downfall. Creating doubt by
examining the public record in comparison to his present testimony would gather the
votes needed to send a symbolic signal to Carter that a treaty negotiated by someone with
Warnke's philosophy faced slim prospects of ratification. The strategy of holding
hearings never changed, but Jackson's tactic adapted to testing the hypothesis of Carter's
press conference pledge that once all considered what Warnke stood for they would vote
for him "overwhelmingly."178 Warnke's change of position, and refusal to admit he had
fundamentally done so, sealed his fate.
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CHAPTER IV

THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARINGS

Two spokesmen for the competing public relations campaigns on strategic
thought met in late February 1977 after weeks of anticipation. Leader of the restraint and
assured destruction community, Paul C. Warnke, faced the leading congressional voice of
defense preparedness, Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), in the Armed Services Committee
(ASC) hearings he and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) insisted on having before voting on
the Senate floor. Senator Jackson's goal was not only to shape SALT II negotiations, but
to change the discourse of U.S. strategic doctrine. Conducting hearings, with the
expectation of media coverage, was his method of fomenting a sea change in strategic
attitudes and reeducating the public on the requirements of deterrence. Jackson
challenged President Carter's pledge that once all considered what Warnke stood for they
would vote for him overwhelmingly. Jackson's political tactic of creating doubt about
Warnke's credibility gathered the votes and Nunn's philosophical tactic of probing
Warnke's definition of superiority established the criteria for a future treaty and a credible
deterrent. Warnke's change of positions, and refusal to admit he had fundamentally
changed, created the conditions for a controversy and tactical grounds for opposing his
nomination. Through the team effort of Jackson and Nunn, Warnke's protagonists
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demonstrated the inadequacy of assured destruction as a credible deterrent and gathered
enough votes to prove they could block a future SALT II treaty that restricted the United
States to a MAD strategy. The construction of a controversy by gathering enough votes
against Warnke reversed the reification of MAD before the ratification of SALT II and
set the media stage for the successful reformation of strategic thought into the 1980s.
The ASC hearings opened on February 22, 1977. Warnke's opening statement
focused on addressing the charges swirling in the media since the Foreign Relations
Committee (FRC) hearings. Notes and drafts of his opening statement in his papers
revealed that he and his defense team had been working since their aftermath to, if not
cover the cracks, address the charges. Thomas Graham, who had initially advised him to
take a right of center turn, took the role of ghost writer for Warnke's opening statement
and anticipated responses. Bill Jackson's admonition to admit to no fundamental change
of view set the tone of Warnke's steadfast demeanor and, to most, his frustrating
implacability. Addressing the focus on his past record, he said that having testified since
1969, "I cannot today support each and every recommendation made in the past eight
years." This was because "subsequent developments" required reassessment of those
ideas, whose merits were, as a "function of timing and substance," now obsolete.179 It
was circumstances, not he, that had changed.
Warnke then turned to SALT itself. The Soviets and the United States had both
availed themselves of freedom to modernize. Addressing the much maligned appearance
of inequality, he argued that U.S. technical and warhead advantages offset Soviet
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numerical ones. The temporary nature of the agreement meant the Soviet's supposed lead
was no cause for alarm.180 This claim addressed Senator Griffin's accusation in the FRC
that Warnke was more concerned now than in 1972 over the numerical imbalance. In one
of the few times he had ever mentioned "heavies" over his career, Warnke then brought
up concern for the Soviet throw weight advantage granted by permitted modernization.
Concerned over the pace of the Soviet buildup, he said that rough equality existed, "but if
trends continue our position could be in jeopardy." He pledged to use arms control
solutions to maintain deterrence in that situation, and was an "enthusiast for making the
effort."181
Jackson was little convinced by Warnke's defense. As the ASC hearings
proceeded, he questioned Warnke's self-representation as a tabula rasa by quoting back to
him his opening statement during the FRC hearings, "I do not have any preconceived
positions with respect to the arms control field."182 Using his skill as a lawyer as if
building his case, Jackson countered that all knew Warnke had written, testified, and
recommended to the extent that it was fair to say he was a "tireless advocate" of views
and positions in the arms control field. Such an abundant public record from which to
draw meant enough evidence to evaluate his "judgment and foresight" in national security
issues. It was Jackson's primary task to "explore that record today."183
Jackson then shifted the focus of skepticism about Warnke's suitability from
substance to character. "What is striking about Mr. Warnke's prepared testimony today is
how markedly it differs from the views he has been expressing for the past eight years,"
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he said. Men changed their minds, he admitted, but "what is unusual is the suddenness
with which Mr. Warnke had come to the conclusions he expressed" in the FRC and
before them today.184 Warnke's new concern over the Soviet buildup, that "our position
could be in jeopardy at some point in the future," troubled him.185 Jackson said that the
"suddenness with which Mr. Warnke has changed his position on a number of central
issues raises some fundamental questions about whether, and to what degree, the Senate
is justified basing its judgment on the assumption of consistency, clarity, and
forthrightness. This, to me, Mr. Chairman, is the central issue before this committee." 186
With that statement, Jackson placed Warnke's integrity within the context of the
memory of SALT I. Trust in negotiators was the Senate's sore spot. None wanted a
repeat of imprecise definitions, ambiguous provisions, or inequality that seemed to be
responsible for potential Soviet superiority. With the skill of a lawyer who knew his
audience and the power of suggestion, Jackson laid out the case from which the whole
hearings flowed.
Jackson sought to set the record straight. Warnke's past weapons
recommendations became the first part of his record lay bare. Jackson compiled a list of
thirteen weapons Warnke had opposed and presented them for Warnke's confirmation as
an accurate summary. Warnke said "Yes, sir, Senator, that is absolutely correct." 187
Those who had read Warnke's FRC testimony were likely struck by the reluctance with
which Warnke acknowledged past recommendations. This was Jackson's purpose in
using the list as a base from which to ask Warnke to supply "where in the record you
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have made different recommendations…prior to your nomination."188 Warnke's response
that he could not cite specific references, because he lacked a "glossary with respect to
the collected works of Paul C. Warnke," did little to nudge the notion of inconsistency
out of the minds of the Senatorial jury.189
The bulk of the secondary literature stops at Jackson's list of thirteen weapons and
Warnke's seven-word affirmation. Glynn, Kaufman, and Powers each quoted that single
interaction without exposition on its substantive meaning or strategic implications, nor
how it was part of Jackson's strategy and tactics.190 In quoting that interaction as
representative of the entire hearings, each assumed that Warnke's opposition to weapons
inevitably made his nomination controversial and was the single cause for the votes
against him.
If Jackson's list of thirteen is instead placed within the framework of his strategy
of constructing a controversy by creating doubt, then the hearings, and the defense
debate, become about much more than weapons programs. Weapons have doctrinal and
postural implications. Behind the weapons was the declaratory doctrine supporting their
rationale, and a philosophy of how much was enough. They represented insurance
against blackmail for preparedness proponents, and the potential specter of a holocaust
for arms controllers. This visceral, philosophical underpinning clashed with the politics
of negotiations as two schools of thought competed in open forum not just over weapons,
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but strategic doctrine.191 By following the hearings' dramatic unfolding with insights into
Jackson's motives and strategy, the substantive issues rumble beneath what seemed on the
surface a skirmish over weapons policy. Close attention to these background issues
revealed the significance of that moment for the deeper debate of which his nomination
was about. Most importantly for the outcome of the hearings, the exchange alone did not
sink Warnke. It was not his record but his change of positions, and his denial that he had
so changed, that created the controversy. It was this synthesis between substance and
politics that made Jackson's tactic so seamlessly effective yet easily missed.
With the sober skill of a sleuth, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) probed and prodded
beneath the surface of Warnke's changing positions. He started by quoting Warnke's
opening statement that if trends continued, "our position could be in jeopardy."192 Nunn
concurred heartily with Warnke's new assessment, but told him that "some of your past
statements I find very, very inconsistent, almost diametrically opposed to the statement
this morning." Nunn concurred with Jackson that a change of mind was fine, but he was
bothered that "you have changed your mind without acknowledging you changed your
mind, and it bothers me worse if you have changed your mind and don't realize that you
changed your mind."193
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Those words would make the straight-jacket of Warnke's commitment to
consistency a coffin. While Warnke thought the comment unexceptionable, Nunn
countered that never before the nomination would such statements have been expected
from him. A dialogue with another Senator in 1976 seemed to prove it. Warnke had then
believed that even if the Soviets completed their programs, there would be no change in
the balance. Nunn asked Warnke how he reconciled the difference. Warnke explained
that Soviet hard target kill and accuracy advancements after those completed programs
made the difference. Even then the United States would still have the edge in hard target
capability.194 But as his record showed, this capability was precisely what Warnke had
campaigned against.
An attempt to salvage Warnke's predicament came from Senator Gary Hart
(D-CO). He also became the first to bring up what lurked in the philosophical
background, the question of Soviet intent and the potential utility of superiority. Warnke
treated it as self-evident that the Soviets would use superiority to U.S. disadvantage
should they gain it, but he qualified their advantage as more of the political than military
kind. A perceived military superiority could leave the other at a political disadvantage,
Warnke had no doubt.195 As this paper argues, this was just such a perception that
Warnke's school sought to replace with the inutility of nuclear weapons.196 In answering
Hart, Warnke remained philosophically consistent if semantically fuzzy, for in the past he
had publically asserted that advantage accrued only if voluntarily ceded. 197
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Inherent confusions in the nature of the strategic thinking debate only became
deeper as Hart led Warnke into another nebulous nuclear division of thought. "We have
proceeded over the past several decades on a theory of deterrence…do you believe that
that theory should be shifted to what has been called a counterforce strategy--that our
strategic capability should be retargeted on hard targets? What are your attitudes toward
that discussion?"198
Hart's phrasing of the question as a dichotomy between deterrence and
counterforce illustrated the philosophical and declaratory rather than military nature of
the public debate. On the declaratory level, some saw counterforce capabilities as
nuclear war-fighting, with all its theoretical and practical implications.
Having been of that school, Warnke explained to Hart that the "fundamental aim
has to be to maximize the deterrent efficacy of our forces" for "assured retaliatory
capability" and perceived equality. The issue was how to achieve that aim. Warnke said
he endorsed refinements in target selection through command and control, but added that
"having a counterforce capability improves deterrence by improving the number of
options the President would have…so I don't think they are alternatives, I think they are
complementary."199
That was the language of the defense advocates, not a deterrence faithful. It hit at
the central question of how much was enough, a direct answer to which his school
avoided by declaring an "assured retaliatory capability" sufficient and large degrees of
counterforce unnecessary.200
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The semantics exhibited in the Senators' questions illustrated the dichotomous
thinking between deterrence and war fighting between the two schools. In reality, there
were degrees of counterforce. Most arms controllers and sufficiency advocates did
approve of limited counterforce, and not many would endorse massive retaliation as the
only option, nor only the ability to strike cities. Such nuances though get lost in the
semantics and linguistic dichotomies employed in debates. The important point is that
these arguments are used politically. Their lack of relation to military reality is precisely
the reason weapons become so significant in the debate. Focus on weapons is a symptom
of the confusion and the result of the misunderstandings created by the semantic debates.
After years of campaigning against counterforce capabilities, Warnke's newfound
appreciation for it would have struck his more ideological arms control colleagues as near
heresy.
To Warnke's doubters, such linguistic admissions were political opportunities.
After reminding the witness of his past record of opposition to new weapons programs
and affinity for unilateral restraint, Senator John Tower (D-TX) asked Warnke if he
believed the Soviet effort indicated an "approach to concepts of deterrence and stability"
similar to the United States. Warnke admitted that indeed some Soviets may espouse a
"nuclear war fighting capability," but U.S. forces and arms control negotiations "ought to
be optimized for deterrence rather than for war-fighting."201
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Warnke's separation indicated the philosophical undercurrent of the strategic
thought debate. His earlier endorsement of counterforce belied the military nuances
underneath. And his semantics illustrated the confusing nature of the public debate that
his antagonists used to their advantage.
Tower's follow-up questions on whether the Soviets "accepted the doctrine of
mutual and assured destruction" as a source of strategic stability or thought "nuclear war
to be unthinkable" identified the crux of the philosophical currents.202 The issue was the
Soviet buildup and the desired U.S. response. The division in responses rested on the
philosophical question of whether one thought nuclear war thinkable or unthinkable.
Warnke's articulated plan to Tower was to probe Soviet intentions through SALT to
explore whether they would accept a "deterrence view rather than a nuclear war fighting
view."203 This was inconsistent with his previous views proposing unilateral initiatives,
Tower charged, and he demanded that Warnke provide evidence of arriving at those
conclusions prior to his confirmation hearings.
Identifying when Warnke had arrived at those newfound conclusions prior to his
nomination was Jackson's fundamental objective. He opened his next line of questioning
by saying, the "importance of the discussion…today lies not just in the substantive
issues." What really troubled him about Warnke being the negotiator was a clearly
established pattern of positions and arguments in the public record over many years, and
now, "on the eve of these hearings, I find a complete change of positions."204 It was not
that he had changed, for "that is fine--we all change. But I can't find in the public record
where you have made statements expressing these fundamental changes prior to your
202
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appearances before the Foreign Relations Committee and this committee today." 205
Jackson asked Warnke to show on the public record where he had changed his mind prior
to the confirmation hearings, for this was the "fundamental principle" as far as he was
concerned.206
The implications were clear. The tone was set. The challenge hung in the air.
The record could not be hidden, and the explanations were suspect.
As Warnke calmly maintained that his fundamental positions were unchanged and
Jackson quipped that "fundamental" was a matter of debate, Jackson turned to his favorite
substantive issue, the "much discussed subject, the meaning of superiority." 207 The
atmosphere thick with both insinuation and substance was the perfect time to probe
Warnke's views on the "military meaning and political implications of superiority."
While Warnke tried to distinguish between the desirability and futility of meaningful
superiority, Jackson interrupted by asking "what do you think the Soviets are really up
to?" Did he not admit in a prior office visit that the Soviets were "out to get
superiority?"208 Warnke repeated his opening statement that if trends continued the
Soviets would have a strategic edge, but he said its military significance was
questionable.
Nunn interrupted Warnke's explanation of his newfound definition of jeopardy to
say that it did not square with what he said in 1976, that the balance would remain
unchanged even if the Soviets continued building. Jackson concurred with "I must say
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that that is not consistent with what you have just said to me," but Warnke replied that it
indeed was.209
The fuzzy semantics may have been illustrative of both the nature of the subject
and the strategy of creating doubt, but it was Jackson's next question that punctured the
confusing atmosphere. "What are the Soviets up to? I think that is what the great
national security debate ought to be about. I raised a question about it and you said that
the Soviets are headed for superiority." 210
Warnke's admission that the Soviets were striving for superiority acknowledged
its appeal. The perennial issues between the two schools were the political implications
of Soviet capabilities and the perception of Soviet superiority and what the necessary
U.S. response should be.
Warnke began making distinctions about those issues, as was his art. He
distinguished between actual and cosmetic superiority. Actual superiority was when one
could not respond to a challenge because one could not prevail. Cosmetic superiority
was the perception of a political disadvantage, "even if in military terms it might not
mean the difference between victory and success."211 Jackson compared the present to
the past Warnke by bringing out an excerpt from a 1971 testimony during the SALT I
ratification hearings. Warnke had then said "nuclear superiority has become a
meaningless and irrelevant criterion in designing strategic forces. The argument
continues to be made, however, that a numerical lead which is militarily meaningless
209
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may somehow be exploitable politically. I feel that this is a fallacy." Warnke concurred
with the statement he made in 1971 but explained to Jackson that that was "not the kind
of superiority that was important."212 In other words, numerical superiority did not
matter in 1971.
Jackson spoke for all when he replied, "you lose me on that," and tried to simplify
matters by pinning a doctrine of minimum deterrence on Warnke. He proceeded with an
excerpt from 1969 in the Congressional Record that "inferiority is no cause for alarm or
even embarrassment if what we have is enough to deter any Soviet preemptive strike."
Well, Jackson said, "that is the doctrine, clearly, of minimum deterrence." All he elicited
from Warnke was, "I don't believe so," to which Jackson said, "well, it is assured
destruction doctrine. How do you reconcile that with what you have just said to this
committee?" It depended on one's definition of superiority, Warnke said.213
Such semantics, charges, and confusion embodied the essence of the decade-long
debate between the two schools, as the politics of arms control merged with the viscerally
charged nature of strategic doctrine in a democracy.
The questions focused on Warnke's consistency in relation to his definition of
superiority. He tried to clarify by defining it in two ways. It was "significant if it has
military significance or if its cosmetic impact is such as to put you at a political
disadvantage. It is consistent with what I testified in 1972 that if you want to put it that
way, inferiority in numbers…was in fact, of no significance."214 Jackson only repeated
the technique of quoting Warnke's words back to him, this time with the now infamous
quote from Warnke's 1972 debate with Buckley: "Even substantial nuclear superiority,
212
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short of nuclear monopoly, could not be a decisive factor in any political confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union."215 Warnke maintained that the case he
was making in 1972 was that no President would sanely use nuclear weapons in a
political crisis because Soviet developments toward parity rendered them politically
impotent. But that "did not suggest, of course, that I would yield meaningful superiority
to the Soviet Union," Warnke said.216 Jackson was less concerned with that at this point.
More immediately disturbing was that Warnke's present words were "incomprehensible
and completely at odds" with his past words.217
Having successfully created confusion over Warnke's definition of superiority,
Jackson moved on to his more fundamental objective, Warnke's credibility. "I am asking
you now, and this is the central issue," when and where "did you arrive at those
changes?"218 Warnke's record stood. Jackson's challenge mounted. His question, as he
addressed the chairman, "goes to the credibility and the viability of the witness as a
negotiator when I find from the printed record, that there has been a consistent pattern of
position and argument up until the nomination was made." He requested that Warnke
supply a written compilation of statements in answer to when and where. Warnke,
Jackson said, had "followed a pretty consistent pattern on fundamental strategic
doctrine," but had changed at the FRC hearings and before them today. Warnke
maintained that his "fundamental position has not changed," Jackson asked when and
where, the witness claimed consistency, and Jackson, with ominous tones, said "we have
a predicate now to proceed on. You are taking the position that you have not changed.
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We will pursue that."219 Warnke's claim of consistency was now the predicate Jackson
would thoroughly explore and the rest of the Senators would persistently follow.
From that point on it mattered little what Warnke really believed or how he
explained past positions. The impression was made, the charges stuck, the witness was
defenseless, and the lawyer, Jackson, was relentless. The question of superiority was
already a contested and pivotal realm of strategic thought between the two schools.
When merged with the question of Warnke's competence and credibility, such
philosophical questions of deterrence theory and force adequacy became politically
charged with personal insinuations of competence and credibility. The question of
superiority was key to both strategic thought and to Warnke's demise.
The second day of the ASC hearings, February 23, opened with some softballs
and hardballs. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) worried that Warnke's attitude
foreshadowed a Carter administration of weakness. Senator William Scott (R-VA) noted
the "considerable opposition" Warnke faced, and narrowed the strategic issues down to
their domestic political core by asking if "you should be confirmed, say by a 60-to-40
vote in the Senate, would you be able, successfully, to negotiate with the Soviet Union
realizing that any treaty negotiated would have to be approved by the Senate by a twothirds vote?" Scott turned the palpable symbolism into tangible bluntness by declaring
"today we are concerned with the superiority of our nation, with the preservation of our
nation, and in all candor I must resolve any doubt that is in my mind against your
nomination; and, therefore…I cannot support your nomination and tend to speak against
it as strongly as I can on the Senate floor. I think you might be the right man in the
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wrong job, and I would recommend the Peace Corps."220 A reminder from Senator
Thomas McIntyre (D-NH) of the Senate's own record of opposing counterforce programs
over the last decade did little to turn the tide. An especially un-charmed Senator
Jesse Helms (R-NC) admitted Warnke's confirmation was scarcely in doubt, but
nonetheless desired to lead Warnke "over a philosophical trail" on negotiations and
Soviet inclinations to "snooker this country."221 The under-bellied soft balls were
abandoned for an ultimate hardball from the senior Senator Sam Nunn, picking up where
Jackson had left off and preparing for the climax of the hearings.
Nunn probed Warnke's definition of jeopardy that he used in his opening
statement. Once more Warnke's recent testimony was the reference point. Warnke had
distinguished in his exchange with Jackson between actual superiority, where one was
not able to respond because one could not prevail, and cosmetic superiority, where
perception put one at a political, but not military, disadvantage. Nunn compared this
definition with Warnke's opening statement, where Warnke said that "if present trends
continue, our position could be in jeopardy at some point in the future."
As the dialogue commenced, the suspense mounted. What was Nunn up to? It
became clear as the exchanges continued. Nunn was after what Warnke meant by "could
be in jeopardy." Warnke's definition of deterrence, of what constituted an assured
retaliatory capability, played a crucial role in what transpired.
There was military superiority and political superiority in terms of perceptions.
Warnke and Nunn agreed on that. So what then did jeopardy mean? Nunn pinpointed
the issue: "do you see that they could put us in a position, if these trends continue, that we
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would not be able to retaliate after absorbing a preemptive attack by them?" Warnke
admitted that was the "ultimate threat to our strategic capability." If "we were in a
position which they, by striking first, could take out so much of our missile force as to
make it unlikely that we would be willing to respond for fear their counterstrike would be
devastating, then we would be deterred; they would not be deterred."222
Nunn pushed before pouncing. That was "something less than the capability of
eliminating our retaliatory capability though, is it not?" It was indeed something short of
that, yes, Warnke admitted. Pushing a little further, Nunn asked what about our
submarines? If the Soviets developed their hard target kill capability would we not still
be able to retaliate with those? Yes of course we would have those, with great
destruction, Warnke replied. Nunn pressed, we would still be in jeopardy in that
situation? Warnke simply stated that "we could be in jeopardy if the Soviets were to
think that we would be deterred and they would not be deterred. It was a question of
deterrence as well as a question of capability." Soviet capability to destroy U.S. land
forces might give them the perception that we would be self-deterred. Nunn clarified this
admission. "Their first strike might preclude our second strike, because we are afraid of
their third strike?" There it was. Warnke replied yes, he could conceive of a situation
that put us at a "disadvantage under those circumstances."223
Well that was the language and feared scenario posed by the defense preparedness
side. It was directly opposite of what Warnke had said in 1972, that such a scenario of
self-deterrence, that "if the Russians are not deterred from a first strike because they think
we won't make a second strike because we are afraid of a third strike, then there is no
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possibility of deterrence," was insanity. 224 Nunn was quick to point that out. Warnke was
even quicker to explain it. But his calmed response could not cover the confusion. Nunn
voiced his distress. He was trying to find ways to support him, he said, on "exactly the
point a lot of people have been debating with all sincerity for a long time, and I think you
have changed your position."225
It was down to principle now. Nunn said he thought Warnke had changed it in
the right direction, but "for you not to think you have changed your position leaves me in
a state of total bewilderment. I don't know where you are."226
The penultimate moment came as the question of superiority turned to how much
was enough. As Warnke explained that the relative capabilities remaining left one or the
other side with an advantage, Nunn said in exasperation, "that is exactly what Jim
Schlesinger's thesis was" when we needed options other than all-out retaliation.227
Warnke told Nunn that flexibility was enough. Nunn clarified, but not hard target kill? If
both sides have it, Warnke said, that was destabilizing.
The issue came down to the Soviets having a counterforce capability that we did
not, Nunn said. The President would "not have the option under your theory to retaliate
against their land based missile systems" because he would have only the option of
retaliating against Soviet cities. The pointed question was "do you follow what I am
talking about?"228 Warnke said he did, and that was the difference between 1972 and
1977. Since the facts had changed since then, Nunn asked Warnke if he was "willing to
reexamine our counterforce capability" based on Soviet developments? Warnke replied,
224

Consideration, 98.
Consideration, 98.
226
Consideration, 98.
227
Consideration, 98.
228
Consideration, 99.
225

75

"Given the fact that the hard target kill capability has increased, I think that has become a
relevant measure of strategic equivalence."229 What about what he said in 1972 that
flexibility was the worst thing one could have because it just means a greater chance they
will be used? Warnke responded "Well, I still feel that having that flexibility, on both
sides, is worse than if you had it on neither side." The rest of the climactic exchange
warrants full exposure:
Senator Nunn: But you do agree that [the Soviets] are developing it, don't you?
Mr. Warnke: I agree, they are developing it. It is one of the objectives we ought
to have in arms control negotiations.
Senator Nunn: You would agree, if we can't achieve that objective, we may have
to develop that, too?
Mr. Warnke: I think we not only would have to develop it, I also think we are
developing it at the present time.
Senator Nunn: Of course, you have been opposed to that development?
Mr. Warnke: I have opposed it on both sides. I am opposed to either side having
the kind of capability that makes nuclear war more feasible and more likely.
Senator Nunn: But you also agree, though, in the final analysis that it is more
dangerous…if they have counterforce, without us having it than if we both have
it?
Mr. Warnke: I agree with that.230

With that, the champion of restraint had rendered the arms control community's decadelong campaign meaningless. Superiority mattered, military capabilities could measure it,
and without counterforce capabilities, the U.S. would be self-deterred, open to Soviet
coercion. The political utility of nuclear weapons was, indeed, possible, and with less
than a capability to disarm the other side. Nunn had gotten Warnke to admit in 1977
what Jackson could not elicit from SALT I negotiator Gerard Smith in 1972. Assured
destruction was not enough to deter in a crisis where the Soviets had a counterforce
capability the President did not have.
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The significance of the admission was shattering. Warnke had stood against
counterforce since 1969 and had publically opposed Schlesinger's 1974 announcement of
it as U.S. strategic doctrine. Now in 1977 he was endorsing it. The theory of deterrence
based on assured retaliation he had championed for years he now admitted as insufficient
in the face of recent developments. The change was enough. But it was the steadfast
refusal to admit he had changed that led directly to the ultimate question of the hearings,
Warnke's credibility. Where did he stand? Could he be trusted? These were the
questions behind the continued probing of Warnke's positions on weapons and
superiority. Jackson tried to pin minimum deterrence on Warnke and Nunn had boxed
Warnke into admitting it was not enough to deter. Confusion abounded, but the motive
was the same. Warnke's agility at making words mean different things, while not
acknowledging the difference, made Senators confused about what Warnke stood for.
Thereafter the themes remained centered on Warnke's competence and credibility.
Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) thought Warnke had weakened his negotiating position by his
past positions. A Goldwater-negotiated treaty would be better trusted.231 He was not
questioning Warnke's integrity, he said, but that seemed to be the implication by the very
comment itself. Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) returned to the changing definitions of
superiority between Warnke past and present, while Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-OK)
referred to the Evans and Novak article in the Washington Post leaking how Carter had
asked the Pentagon how much it would take to maintain minimum deterrence. Senator
Hart objected that it sounded like Warnke had been nominated for Secretary of Defense
rather than arms negotiator, that asking when Warnke changed was like asking "when I
fell in love with my wife," and that the proceedings were really a lesson in not writing
231
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articles or giving speeches for fear they would be "thrown up to them" twenty years from
now.232 Senator Nunn interrupted to acknowledge that Warnke's confirmation was not in
doubt. The "question we are deciding is how we are going to individually vote." 233 The
pending vote was just what the immediate focus on Warnke's inconsistency was all about.
Jackson and Nunn had successfully accomplished their immediate goal, but
Jackson had yet to get to the real politics motivating him, SALT. He cited past and
present records to build his case. Warnke had said in 1972 that Soviet numerical
advantage was "of no significance as long as we possess the ability to destroy the Soviet
Union even if they were first to strike," and that "we can accept the numerical imbalance
because it is in fact totally irrelevant to our security." He told Griffin during the FRC
hearings that he was concerned about "numerical disparity…because it seemed to me that
made the agreement perceptually vulnerable." What accounted for the difference? 234
Warnke said the political ramifications of an apparent lead concerned him,
Jackson asked when and where prior to 1977, Warnke tried to explain, and Jackson
interrupted with, "well, here we go again." Where Warnke was "running into trouble"
was the conflict between what he said during confirmation and his previous statements
over a period of time. Jackson then made a connection to SALT in the minds of the
Senatorial jury by asking Warnke if he had criticized SALT I for imprecise language.
Warnke said he was indeed dissatisfied over "loopholes" in the agreement.235
The implications of Warnke's fuzziness for SALT motivated Jackson's
assessment. He said he was "seeking an explanation here," but was disturbed by seeming
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"outright contradictions" between the confirmation hearings and "fundamental views over
the last several years." If Warnke could not see the difference, that "would call your
judgment and perceptiveness into question."236 It was "time to bring this to a head. If
you maintain these are not fundamentally different positions, even though they appear to
be so by any ordinary interpretation, that suggests to me an ability on your part to find
needle-threading loopholes and saving reservations, to a degree, that would disturb me on
two counts."237 Playing on the disappointments and anxieties over SALT I, Jackson
skillfully combined Warnke's past reputation and present confusion to emblazon on the
Senate's mind the untrustworthiness of a Warnke-negotiated treaty. The Senatorial
audience must have been leaning at the edge of their seats as Jackson proceeded. "First, I
would worry about your holding the Soviets to a firm interpretation of agreements that
they might sign. And second--and perhaps more important--I would find it difficult to
place much confidence in the crucial explanations you will have to present to the
Congress about treaties that you will negotiate."238
The psychological work of creating doubt accomplished, Jackson followed up
with the substantive work of exhausting a thorough examination of Warnke's inescapable
record. He presented Warnke with a list of nine of the nominee's apparent contradictions
and asked him to verify when he had changed prior to the nomination. The list of nine
allegations on such topics as superiority, counterforce and minimum deterrence, and
SALT I became the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that Jackson used to seal his case.
The list of nine allegations' intended effects were immediate as the wafting pall of
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Carter's pledge, that once all considered what Warnke stood for they would approve him
overwhelmingly, hovered over Jackson's compelling tactic of creating doubt.
The success of Jackson's tactic was most clearly seen in Senator Robert Byrd's
(D-WV) turn at the helm. "I might say, Mr. Chairman, in reading the record of
yesterday's hearings that there is some confusion as to exactly what Mr. Warnke stands
for. I will need to study the record before I can ask some more questions."239 Time did
little to resolve the doubt, as it left him later to say only, "I find it will take some time to
study these proceedings. I am totally confused as to just what is Mr. Warnke's position
now, vis-à-vis what his position has been in the past." Finally he gave up and just
followed Jackson's example by asking Warnke about his opposition before and his
acquiescence now to the B-1 bomber.240 The use of Jackson's tactic demonstrated the
Washington lawyer's success and sealed the case that reasonable doubt precluded
affirmation of Carter's pledge of complete confidence.
The tactic was brilliant, the effect immediate, and the defense pointless. Asked if
he had any final words, Warnke stated plainly, "I think, Mr. Chairman, that I am about
talked out."241 Once ready for an open dialogue, he was now personally spent. The press
and his critics were only just beginning.
Throughout the first two days of Warnke's appearances media headlines and
rhetoric were both dramatic and penetrating. They commented on the "withering
questions" from the "grueling cross examination," and on Warnke's assailed status from
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the "onslaught."242 They identified Jackson as the "vanguard of the sustained attack"
from "anti-Warnke forces" who hoped to "muster enough support to block" Warnke's
nomination on the Senator floor and weaken Warnke's bargaining position. 243 The New
York Times thought that Jackson's attempt to show inconsistencies in Warnke's record
was meant to "prove that he had altered his views only in the last month with the aim of
winning Senate confirmation."244
The record alone, though, was insufficient. By Nunn's own admission they
thought he would have no trouble being confirmed.245 The constraining factor according
to Congressional Quarterly was the desire by Democrats to avoid a direct challenge on
policy grounds in support of their new President, a desire particularly troublesome for
Jackson.246 To most observers, it still seemed that Warnke's critics had yet to "come up
with a tactic to derail the nomination."247
Senator Griffin's dissenting remarks from the majority report of the FRC on
February 25 hinted at just such a tactic. Griffin wrote that before the first day of the FRC
hearings, "it was no problem to determine what Mr. Warnke stood for." It was now
apparent that Warnke had "suddenly changed his mind," misrepresenting long held
positions.248 Excerpts from Warnke's past remarks on weapons programs, the defense
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budget, mutual restraint, and strategic superiority, compared to his Foreign Relations
testimony, pitted Warnke against himself. A genuine conversion was welcome, but
Griffin could not "help but wonder what brought about this strange and sudden
transformation." Even a genuine rebirth raised the question of whether it was the "new,
or the old, Warnke that President Carter really wanted" for negotiator. 249 Given the
importance to the people, Griffin intoned, of an equitable SALT II Treaty, "which would
require the support of two-thirds of the Senate before ratification--I would hope that
President Carter would view anything short of overwhelming Senate confirmation of
Mr. Warnke as a signal to reconsider and withdraw his nomination."250 The tactical turn
toward the credibility of the negotiator and the strategic use of confirmation votes in a
democracy followed inexorably from the efforts and leadership of "Scoop" Jackson.
While by the weekend of February 25, 1977, the turn from the substantive to the
personal was undeniable, only one commentator correctly identified the deeper defense
questions motivating the effort. Lee Lescaze of the Washington Post wrote that the
personalized tactic "rarely addressed directly" the underlying questions of how much was
enough and how best to approach negotiations. Instead the opposition focused on
Warnke's credibility, his understanding of the Soviet threat, and his past positions on
weapons systems, with the hope that if "they can demonstrate he changed his positions
only to win confirmation, they can gather enough opposition to block the nomination." 251
That was precisely the tactic that would if not unseat Warnke as negotiator, send
the desired message to Carter to go slow in SALT II and anticipate a rocky ratification
debate. Even Lescaze, though, did not foresee that the tactic would not only address, but
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also give an answer to, the perennial defense question of how much was enough for a
credible deterrent. The team effort of Jackson, Nunn, and Nitze would combine the
personal with the substantive in a way easily missed but brilliantly executed. Asking
who was the real Paul Warnke in the end answered how much was enough for a credible
deterrent.

Armed Services Committee Hearings Part II
Called as one of the two witnesses in opposition as the hearings resumed on
February 28, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze took his seat before a
doubting Senate and a riveted press. Some had suggested, he began in his opening
statement, that he was motivated by "personal animus" against Mr. Warnke. 252 While
that was indeed what George Christie suggested to Warnke in a letter after Nitze's FRC
testimony,253 Nitze publically claimed that it was not so.254 Instead, their differences
were substantive. Retreating from his earlier adjectives of "asinine," "arbitrary and
screwball," he rehearsed doubts about Warnke's clarity and consistency. Someone whose
reasoning was "so subtle as to be widely misleading" inspired little confidence that
Warnke would be one who all understood what he meant by his public statements. Both
sides, he continued, could agree on the need for "prudent arms control" and adequate
defenses. The divisive issues were in the specifics. The underlying issue, in Nitze's
estimation, was how exactly to deny the Soviets any significant margin of superiority. 255
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With characteristic genius Nitze grounded his opposition in the substantive but
left the larger impression of the personal with political implications. Nitze cited Warnke
as saying "we cannot accede to Soviet nuclear superiority," but continued that "if he
means that in any sense that ordinary mortals would understand it to mean, there is no
issue with Mr. Warnke on this point."256 Perhaps Warnke's subtlety meant he had "in
mind U.S. nuclear capabilities substantially inferior" to the Soviets. An "objective study
of the record" demonstrated Warnke had consistently rejected all of the proposals
designed to check adverse trends. Nitze thought that it was "this cavalier attitude of
imprudence which I think disqualifies Mr. Warnke" in the field of arms control. Since
the Soviets were out to achieve "socialist triumph" by dominating the world, any
agreement had to help check such adverse trends.257
A national debate was the domestic solution Nitze was looking for. If the
implication that Warnke negotiating a reversal of trends was not likely, Nitze made sure
that eventually it would be prevented by "having made possible a debate which, through
concentrating on the qualifications of one man…has necessarily spread to the most basic
underlying issues" of prudent arms control within the framework of national security.258
Warnke's character and competence were up first in that debate. Nitze elaborated
to Senator Tower on Warnke's "lack of due care…and understanding." The nominee's
opposition to accuracy in particular left Nitze baffled as to how "one can do anything but
lose a war in the event deterrence fails and one only goes after cities because one has no
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capability of going after military targets." 259 That was indeed the whole crux of the
substantive matter that divided the two schools of thought over the previous decade.
What seemed immediately politically important in 1977 was the lack of
understanding over Warnke's philosophical evolution rather than the changing
requirements of a credible deterrent. Warnke's "great ability at confusing people" seemed
to Nitze a "wilderness….he mystifies me."260 Even an attempt by Senator McIntyre to
show "how easily sincere disagreements about particular issues can be invalidly
translated into unfortunate personal attacks on a nominee's character and even his
Americanism" backfired. McIntyre's attempt to defend Warnke only cajoled Nitze into
denigrating Warnke's patriotism:
McIntyre: Well, if you valued him as a former colleague, it makes it pretty clear
that you don't really basically object to Mr. Warnke's character.
Nitze: It does not. I have said I have valued him. Frankly, I cannot understand
the things he has been saying in the last few days. I do not think they are proper.
McIntyre: Are you saying you impugn his character as an American citizen?
Nitze: If you force me to, I do.
McIntyre: That is very interesting. Do you think you are a better American than
he is?
Nitze: I really do.261
In his memoirs, Nitze said that he meant to say, "I really do take exception to what I
believe to be inconsistent and misleading testimony by Mr. Warnke," and complained
that the "press pounced on that remark and ignored most of the discussion of the
substantive issues."262 In reality, he was himself as responsible as the press by focusing
on Warnke's "desperately eager" attempts to "soft peddle his earlier statements on
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defense and arms control,"263 charging him not only with "asinine" viewpoints but
dishonesty. As Thomas Graham explained, it was a "tragic story" that the former friends
"ceased speaking to one another altogether as a result of the…confirmation battle," and
that "bitterness remained for more than twenty years later." 264 When the stakes were as
high as votes for confirmation with a SALT II debate pending, unfortunate personal
attacks were the price of disagreements over particulars in a democracy.
Nitze explained to the ASC that the differences over weapons were not the
primary issue. Growing on the vine of the substantive root of their differing judgments
was Warnke's impenetrability. Nitze insisted that an agreement must be understandable
to the Senate and American people. He said that either Warnke has not "understood what
this thing is about or else he has not made it clear to me or to anybody else what is in the
back of his mind; and I still don't think I understand what is in the back of his mind."265
The question kept returning to the meaning of superiority. Even Nitze admitted it
was not easy to be precise.266 Warnke's definition of it and what to do in response to the
Soviets gaining it, were at the core of why Warnke's clarity and consistency mattered.
Combining superiority and integrity was also a tactically advantageous way to persuade
the audience of Warnke's unsuitability. Warnke's contrast to himself, if not the agreed
meaning of superiority, was clear.
The bewildering impression left from such direct comparisons between the old
and new Warnke was also, conveniently, the calculated intention of an old friend of
Nitze's. Senator Jackson opened his line of questioning with a biographical sketch.
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He reintroduced Nitze as a scholarly professional with unparalleled understanding of
strategic doctrine. "Intellectually honest" with "no axe to grind," only a deep concern
about U.S. security when most thought "all you had to do was to get communists out
from under the bed; you didn’t need to worry about national defense, just get them out
from under the bed." Nitze was a "great civil libertarian" who stood up and was counted,
and "I think the issue of integrity and honor is a proper matter before this committee. I
am not raising that now in reference to Mr. Warnke. I am simply pointing out that Mr.
Nitze is a distinguished and credible witness."267
The seed laid, Jackson germinated it by asking if Nitze recalled Warnke
expressing views similar to those given in the last few weeks prior to the nomination. Of
course Nitze did not so recollect. Jackson asked if Nitze thought Warnke was worried
about the Soviet buildup before, and Nitze replied that he did not think so.
Jackson then moved on to SALT. Far from Warnke's view that "the numbers
game is not worth playing" and a "mindless exercise," both Jackson and Nitze agreed that
SALT was about numbers if nothing else. Finally, Jackson gave the doctrinal test by
saying, "Warnke has for many years held the view that an assured destruction capability
is the only legitimate U.S. strategic force objective. I wonder if you could comment on
the implications of this view for SALT…what logical consequences flow" from that view
with respect to what kind of agreement one would negotiate, and do the "Soviets share
that view"?268 With communists lurking if no longer under the domestic bed then in
Soviet nuclear ICBM's equipped with MIRVs, the doctrinal assumptions of the negotiator
were viscerally imperative.
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The central question was, what is assured destruction? In other words, how much
was enough? Together Jackson and Nitze tried to ascertain Warnke's mind. Nitze
acknowledged that in McNamara's day 400 weapons against industrial targets might have
been enough. He described Warnke as thinking anything beyond that was "cosmetic and
not the essence of deterrence."269 The question then became whether, if trends continued,
a difference of 10,000 mattered in comparison to 400? Was that meaningful superiority?
Nitze said it was, but thought Warnke would say it was not a meaningful difference. Or
at least that was what Nitze believed to be Warnke's view during the times he spoke on
assured destruction.270 Jackson tactfully, or tactically at that point, yielded the floor to
his waiting teammate, Senator Nunn.
Armed with a clear idea of where he was headed, Nunn began with a quote from
the 1972 Buckley-Warnke debate. In 1972 Warnke had said "the only way we can deal
with the U.S.S.R. is by nuclear arms with the concept of assured destruction." In the
debate he also argued that if the Russians are not deterred from striking first because
"they think we won't make a second strike because we are afraid of a third strike, then
there is no possibility of deterrence. But that, I submit, would be insanity on the part of
the Soviet leaders, and I am not prepared to ascribe insanity to them. If I did, I would
lose my own sanity, I think we all would."271
In other words, the idea of self-deterrence was simply not plausible. Any
capability to retaliate, no matter how small, would deter. With that quote in mind, Nunn
then read the portion of his own exchange with Warnke the week prior. Warnke had then
admitted a definition of jeopardy as the inability to retaliate if the Soviets had a capability
269
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of taking out only a percentage of U.S. missiles, because something less than a capability
to disarm would deter the United States from a second strike. That was self-deterrence,
even with the capability to use submarines in response.
The comparison seemed obvious. Nunn asked Nitze if in his professional opinion
that represented a change of position, and Nitze replied indeed it did. Would Nitze say
that "the dialogue put to Mr. Warnke squarely in favor of the Jim Schlesinger theory of
being able to respond…with less than an attack on their cities, therefore, he is basically
endorsing the Schlesinger theory which was debated here for 2 years?" Nitze replied
"Oh, as I read the transcript, there were other places where he specifically so endorsed
it."272 Yet what seemed clear to confused observers was Warnke's inability to see or
admit a change. That was the important issue.
What mattered now was less the credibility of the deterrent than the nominee.
Nunn declared dramatically, "What I am trying to get at basically is, what kind of
thinkers do we have here to negotiate with the Soviets?" It was a "very substantial
change of position, and is the equivalent of endorsement of counterforce on our side if the
Soviets have counterforce."273
That was it. The long-time champion of assured destruction as being enough to
deter, and agreements as the solution to increasing Soviet capabilities. had on the stand
endorsed all he had stood against for years. Nunn thought that the "gross
inconsistencies" made Warnke's credentials for either post questionable.274 Even more
important, the question hanging in the air was who had Carter nominated?
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Lest the media miss it, Nunn made sure the implications of the change were clear.
He said that "the people for a long time thought" Nitze and Warnke were on opposite
sides of the strategic debate. Now before two committees over two weeks he had
switched sides. As Nitze argued that Warnke's recently stated negotiating objectives
were impossible to meet, Nunn clarified, "you mean what he has done, he has circled you
on the right, hasn't he…it should be the liberals that are opposed to him rather than those
who are 'hawks,' right?"275
Nunn made sure the change would not go unnoticed. He paused for a somber
moment to observe, "I think the news media have been very, very interested for a long
time in the whole counterforce argument." Counterforce was a hot topic "batted back and
forth; yet we have someone who has appeared before this committee for the most
significant negotiating role we have, and we went into considerable dialog in several
questions, not just mine, where a man who had totally opposed counterforce came before
this committee and endorsed it last week." Nunn thought it was ignored in the media,
saying that "if the American people are going to understand something in advance about
the SALT agreement…these kinds of dialog" were a necessary service to meaningful
debate. He lamented that "diametrically opposing positions can be portrayed before a
congressional committee on important matters of this concern with no real media
coverage so that the American people can make their judgment."276
Educating the people about strategic doctrine was what the long-term domestic
effort was all about. Nunn's teammate Jackson then interceded to drive home the point.
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This committee, the Washington lawyer said,
has rendered a great service here in going into-and in some detail- the whole
philosophy of deterrence, raising most of the key questions relating to deterrence
and to strategic doctrine. I must say that I am as amazed as the Senator from
Georgia with the responses that we got from Mr. Warnke. It is very clear to me
that there is a total change in approach without any analysis or explanation to
indicate when that change occurred…I can't find the rationale or basis for the
change.277

The tactical focus on Warnke's credibility so seamlessly interwoven with the strategic
focus on strategic doctrine finally culminated in its desired political effect. Warnke, past
or present, negotiator or advocate, could not be trusted. The political cartoon by Warren
King distributed earlier in February, of doves descending on Warnke for his revised
views, had by the hopes and through the deliberate tactics of the hawks become a
potential reality. Suspected as a "superdove" before the nomination, and exposed as one
in hawk's feathers to win confirmation, Warnke's supporters could not but feel a little
disillusioned and his opponents a little vindicated. Few were convinced that an assured
destruction apostle could transform into a genuine counterforce convert overnight.
The philosophical and tactical climax may have passed, but the political effects
continued to ricochet as the last witness took the stand and Jackson closed on the issue of
strategic doctrine. As was now typical, Admiral Moorer objected on both substantive and
personal grounds. Warnke's defense positions were proven inadequate, and his present
transformation was suspect. Had someone who discounted the utility of nuclear
weapons, the importance of superiority, and the need for an increased defense effort
suddenly converted? Jackson centralized the matter around the undeniably basic issue,
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the "substantial change of view" between Warnke's Foreign Relations and Arms Services
Committee testimonies and his past record.
Jackson pivoted the question of change around the matter of strategic doctrine.
As one conversant in arguments about various doctrines, Jackson asked, what did he
understand Warnke's position to be? Moorer thought that based on his past
recommendation, the basic thrust was that of minimum deterrence. He elaborated that
"my primary concern now lies in the uncertainty as to just where Mr. Warnke does
stand."278 That was all Jackson needed from Moorer, and he bid him thanks as he
addressed the Chairman, "that is all."279 The spontaneous response could not have been
better orchestrated.
A last plea entered in the printed record from another colleague of Jackson's
illustrated the synthesis between the philosophical debate and the political stakes.
Jackson asked to officially submit as part of the record a letter from another friend, the
"distinguished scholar," former Under Secretary of State, and co-chair of the CPD,
Eugene V. Rostow. One line from Rostow's letter got the desired point across that
Warnke was "still the prisoner of Robert McNamara's theory of Mutual Assured
Destruction. That theory was dubious in its heyday. It is now obsolete," and its living
practitioner could not be trusted to negotiate.280
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The Comma Controversy, the Warnke Vote, and the Real Paul Warnke
If there was any doubt that Warnke's past record and present testimony were too
inconsistent to confirm him as negotiator, it dissolved on the Senate floor in what became
known as the comma controversy. Warnke's past record alone may not have been enough
to block his nomination, but his change of positions created enough doubt to cause a
crisis of confidence in him as the designated negotiator. The crisis emerged just in time
to dominate the Senate floor debate that began in earnest on March 4.
A typographical error in Warnke's written responses to Jackson's nine allegations
of inconsistency became the center of the constructed controversy. The thirty-seven page
document was written to address the "overall contention that until my testimony at the
confirmation hearings, I am not taking a forthright public position on the nature of the
Soviet threat or the significance of perceptions of superiority" and to "corroborate the
consistency of my positions."281 It had the opposite effect. The sentence that caused
such a stir came from his SALT I testimony in 1972. He had then testified “that the
continuation of the missile numbers game is in fact a mindless exercise, that numerical
superiority, which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort
of political potential has no purpose." In his written response, the comma disappeared,
leaving the sentence to read, "there is no purpose in either side achieving a numerical
superiority which is not translatable into either any sort of military or any sort of political
potential." The original 1972 sentence implied that superiority was categorically
impossible. Without the comma, the 1977 sentence implied that some kinds of
superiority could be desirable or had political utility. Senator Robert Griffin was the first
to seize on the discrepancy and to build his speech on the Senate floor around its
281
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implications.282 He interpreted the 1972 original to mean that Warnke had "clearly
argued that the “numbers game” is a “mindless exercise” because numerical superiority
isn't important either militarily or politically." Griffin continued that "in the 1977
alteration, however, the 'mindless exercise' phrase has vanished and--for want of a
comma--Warnke is suddenly qualifying his lack of concern about numerical superiority.
He now finds no purpose in numerical superiority unless it has political or military
value."283
In Griffin's view, the dropped comma constituted charges of a false conversion
and demonstrated Warnke's "shocking willingness to tamper with the public record."
Citing Warnke's past unconcern, he said but "now, with his confirmation as our chief
negotiator pending, Warnke has changed his tune….now he wants the Senate to believe
that he was worried back in 1972 about the numerical disparity between the U.S. and
Soviet Union."284 By eliminating a comma, Warnke "as if by magic---is transformed"
from a man who "shrugs off Soviet superiority to one who is worried about it."285 It was
"one thing to change your mind and then to acknowledge" doing so, but "ethics demand
that you not rewrite the public record to gild your past views--or to pretend your mind
hasn't changed after all." If Warnke's misrepresentation of his past record was an
indication of the "way he would deal with the Senate if confirmed, it is well that we learn
it now," and he urged the Senate to deny Warnke both positions.
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It was a perfect opening for Jackson to seal the case beyond reasonable doubt. On
the Senate floor Jackson said that Warnke's "failure to acknowledge he has revised his
earlier dovish views on national security has shattered my confidence," and he announced
he would vote against Warnke's confirmation:
I cannot vote to confirm a man who has shattered my confidence that I know
where he stands, that I know what he believes. I do not know where he stands
and I do not know what he believes. And I don't expect to be able in the future to
place complete confidence in the explanations he will be called upon to make
when we have before us a treaty whose meaning derives as much from the
negotiating record as a necessarily incomplete and partial language. 286
Carter's pledge of confidence and Warnke's change of position were the tactical grounds
for denying Carter his chosen negotiator in the politically constructed crisis of
confidence.
While Warnke explained the mistakes as unintentional, his detractors extrapolated
the meaning of the typographical error as portentous for SALT II. Whatever the
transcription read, he said he meant that the Soviet missile launcher lead of 1972 did not
give them a military advantage. Explaining in a letter to Chairman John Stennis (D-MS),
"I specifically stated [in 1972] that numerical superiority which is not translatable into
either any sort of military capability or any sort of political potential has no purpose." 287
Warnke said that he did not mean to imply that no future Soviet modernization could
threaten our deterrent. Still insisting that his views were "basically unchanged," Warnke
reaffirmed his basic thesis that neither would allow the other to achieve meaningful
superiority.288 Hubert Humphrey (R-MN) said "I've never heard so much fuss" about a
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dropped comma "since I was in the eighth grade!" Calling for Warnke's withdrawal,
Senator James McClure (R-ID) said "the record is replete not just with misplaced
commas, but with misplaced confidence."289 Senator Howard Baker (R-TN) wanted
"someone so credible that they'd accept his word on any agreement--someone like Barry
Goldwater."290 In his speech on the Senate floor, Senator Nunn said that SALT
agreements were controversial enough by themselves, but "when you take a person who
is so controversial and you place him in charge of an agreement that is this difficult
anyway, then I think the chances of having a SALT II agreement are diminished." 291 As
Griffin had said, if this was what Carter could expect of the SALT II ratification debate, it
was better to know it now.
In the immediate politics of the vote, the misplaced confidence was not so much
about Warnke as about controlling SALT II. A vote against Warnke should read as a
warning to Carter that any "effort to whisk through a SALT II agreement…will face a
tough challenge from hardliners in the Senate."292 The Washington Post could not
fathom a rationale for why they wished to "cripple him by stacking up forty or more
onto a level which would be meaningful in the context of my suitability" for both posts, "I would like to
reaffirm my views which have been basically unchanged over the years." Paul C. Warnke, letter to John C.
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votes against him," viewing the "weeklong assault on Warnke" as shedding "all pretense
of being a reasoned debate."293
President Carter had a theory for why the opposition wished to cripple his chosen
candidate. In another press conference held on March 9, Carter responded to a question
about the effect of the debate over Warnke's qualifications on negotiations by confidently
asserting, "I don't believe that the exact vote in the Senate on Warnke's confirmation will
have a major effect on future negotiations with the Soviets on SALT." 294 For a President
who had in early February said Warnke's nomination was crucial to the success of his
administration, the comment could be interpreted as acknowledging the strength of the
effort against Warnke. Still, Carter held out hope for a strong vote and maintained
"complete confidence" in Warnke. He theorized that "the attacks on Warnke are
primarily by those who don't want to see substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in the
world." While Carter hoped the fact that any treaty would have to be approved by a
"two-thirds vote after complete and open debate" would reassure the skeptics,295 the
skeptics used the Warnke vote to presage that debate.
The opposition's efforts had their intended effect in time for the Senate vote on
March 9. For the less contentious post of director, the Senate approved Warnke 70-29.
For the crucial post of negotiator, Warnke barely passed by a vote of 58-40. The proWarnke vote was eight short of the two-thirds majority needed for treaty ratification.
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Jackson's tactics had successfully mustered even more than the symbolic one-third of
Senators against him. Doubts about Warnke's competence and character denied him the
overwhelming support Carter had hoped for and promised.
Interpretations of the vote came swiftly. Supporters found Warnke's flexibility a
mark of a good negotiator and took his explanations at face value. But a Senate aide told
Congressional Quarterly (CQ) that the changes in position were "responsible for the
debate's emphasis on Warnke's credibility rather than on strategic policy," and that both
sides "credited the size of the vote against confirmation to the credibility issue." Jackson
took credit for the victory by saying, "I don't think there were more than 25 votes against
him three weeks ago." Those persuaded against confirmation, Jackson said, "had come to
doubt his intellectual honesty."296
It was an accurate boast. In the ASC's informal report, the consensus of the
individual views was that Warnke's past record alone was enough to cause doubt, since
the attitudes he took to SALT were crucial. But it was his "obvious change in position
since the nomination and his unwillingness to acknowledge that change," in the words of
Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), that compelled denying confirmation. None were
convinced that Warnke had reformed overnight. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) said
dramatically, "the American people are entitled to ask: 'Will the real Mr. Warnke please
stand up.' They are entitled to know which is the real Paul Warnke" Carter had
nominated.297 Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) illustrated Jackson's success in making that the
decisive barometer in approving Warnke by concluding, "Jackson has presented the best
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case against Mr. Warnke on this issue, and I must say that he has persuaded me."298 The
Senate simply did not share Carter's complete confidence in a man whose agility at
ambiguity overshadowed his forthright clarity. Jackson had kept his promise that he
would "weaken Warnke's role as negotiator to the point of uselessness by holding the
vote in favor to 60 or less."299
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

So what did Warnke really believe? Did it matter? Could he have avoided the
month-long controversy and its repercussions if he had just acknowledged he had
changed his positions?
The media thought so. Yet if Jackson's ultimate goal was to reeducate the public
on strategic doctrine, commentators remained oblivious as Warnke himself continued to
dominate attention. In a letter to the editor of the New Yorker, John Newman thought the
"flap over the [dropped] comma" could have been avoided by a proper use of the English
language, yet he still hoped that Warnke negotiated a treaty that made such proper use. 300
The Corpus Christi Caller affirmed Warnke's past stands alone warranted hesitation, but
they found along with the defense hardliners that "more troubling is the manner in which
he responded to questions." Warnke "gave the appearance, correctly or not, of a man
trying almost desperately to wriggle off the hook." Had Warnke "simply acknowledged
past views and explained the subsequent changes…it would have left us with a much
more reassuring impression of the man."301 Instead, the emblazoned impression was of a
man responsible for his own demise, as A. L. Kaufman's simple and succinct cartoon of a
figure hanging from a comma accompanying Newman's letter implied:
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SALT II would be under "microscopic scrutiny" 302 as a result of the Washington
lawyer's efforts, but Jackson's and Nunn's success in demonstrating the inadequacy of
assured destruction went unnoticed.
The Senate vote analysis made it clear that what the nomination was truly about
and what Warnke stood for were never really in doubt. The individual votes broke down
along strategic and political lines. Supporters of Warnke were also supporters of an
amendment to a 1976 procurement authorization bill to stop research on counterforce
programs. Of the 29 senators who voted to pass the amendment, 28 voted for Warnke.
Most were Democrats. Of the 36 who voted against the amendment, 10 of the 12 that
decided to vote for Warnke were also Democrats. The remainder who split their votes for
the amendment also did so for the nomination, with Democrats supporting their new
President's choice and Republicans voting against.303 The vote reflected what the debate
was fundamentally all about, the perennial debate between assured destruction and
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counterforce in rhetoric and capabilities as the requirements for deterrence in the nuclear
age.
The media may have remained oblivious to the philosophy behind the vote, but
the vote did illustrate the politics of strategy in a democracy. Jackson and Nunn voted
against Warnke only for negotiator, splitting their votes and refraining from attaching
individual views to the informal committee report.304 Senators Byrd, Griffin, and Stennis
refused him for both.305 The CQ's speculation that Jackson did not relish going into
battle against his new president likely accounts for Jackson's focus on the credibility
issue. He could avoid a direct policy challenge while still using the hearings to create a
controversy.306 Hearings would establish the legislative record, and media coverage
would ensure its national attention. As his biographer Kaufman chronicled, it was a
tactic Jackson often repeated to great success.307
Yet it was also not the best showmanship. A personal friend wrote Warnke on
March 15 that he was "more than a little righteously indignant over the last several
weeks" over the "posturing that has been going on...the thing that bothers me most about
the Senator from Washington is that he really knows better." He had noticed that Jackson
talked rationally about the energy crisis of the early 1970s, but "when it finally hit he was
in the forefront demagogging about bad guys in the oil industry. It was a poor show and I
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have never forgotten the contrast."308 The Washington Post gave such assessments public
coverage by quoting one of Warnke's supporters who likened Jackson's desire to find
inconsistencies in Warnke's positions to "George Santayan's definition of a fanatic as a
man who redoubles his efforts as he loses sight of his goals."309
U.S. News & World Report illustrated the paradoxical nature of Jackson's tactical
efforts by asking "which Paul Warnke has the President chosen?" in late March.310 The
article asked if it was the "old Warnke," whose stubborn opposition "would seem to
automatically disqualify him," or the "new Paul Warnke," who was a "changed man"
with an open mind? Carter's choice was a mistake because "his dovish record and
inconsistency" disqualified him as the "best man" for instilling the "full confidence of a
two-thirds majority of the Senate, which--by that margin--must ratify any treaty that
Warnke negotiates."311 Warnke's inconsistency was the central factor in making of his
nomination the controversy Jackson needed not only to shape SALT, but strategic
doctrine, which, paradoxically, was nowhere in the newspapers to be found.
That Warnke's views were never truly in doubt and were only part of the
opposition's immediate tactic of gaining the desired votes can be seen from each side's
activities after the nomination.
Few would be surprised to find that Warnke's fundamental views were always
intact. Warnke had given an interview with the New Republic in October 1976,
scheduled for publication in late March of the next year. Just before the sensitive time of
the Senate vote in early March, the interviewer sent Warnke an edited transcript with
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suggestions for substituting "a small number" for "four ballistic missile submarines as
constituting a force sufficient for minimum deterrence."312 Warnke agreed the
substitution would be wise but added, "as I indicated, I think that some of my comments,
though I continue to adhere to them, might be considered indiscreet in the event of my
confirmation."313
The self-conscious advocate's interview appeared as scheduled with the aptly
chosen title, "The Real Paul Warnke" on March 26.314 To the question of what was
enough, he confidently asserted that a fraction of the current arsenal could deter. Seeking
advantage and insisting on being number one was only "chauvinistic bombast." To the
question of what was behind the alarm about Soviet advantage, Warnke pleaded
semantics: it "depends what you mean by superiority." A perception of superiority might
grant political disadvantage even though militarily insignificant. That was why "poormouthing" U.S. capability was such a bad idea.315 Just as he had been arguing for years,
he said that Soviet missile superiority was a "kind of superiority without significance
unless by our own rhetoric we give it superiority it does not deserve."316 As for the
Russian doctrine of a thinkable nuclear war, Warnke proposed educating them to the
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"real world," that nobody can win a nuclear war.317 He declared that SALT was the
perfect context in which to "move toward a policy of reciprocal restraint."318 It seemed
the only hindrance to reaching his goals was full disclosure of his convictions over time.
For personal reasons, and as previously arranged with President Carter, Warnke
resigned from negotiator and director on Halloween of 1978 before he could implement
his convictions, and just in time for the beginning of the SALT II ratification hearings. 319
In July of that year, Congressional Quarterly had asked Warnke if he was "afraid in light
of the fact that Senator Jackson is on record opposing your nomination, and some other
so-called hawks in the Senate…that you might become an issue" during ratification.
Warnke thought he would not, but said "it was lucky that I was not a Treaty."320
Just after resigning, Warnke was asked at a press conference what it was like to
"negotiate with the administration," and how he thought "his own position stood up in
these contests." He replied, "I would say that the voice of ACDA has been heard and
that we’ve won our share of arguments." He may have been reluctant to take the job at
first, but he "grew to love it" and liked to think the "treaty is a little better because I've
been a participant."321 He conceded from experience that, "I don't think that it's as
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important for somebody to have both jobs [of director and negotiator] in the future."322
The concession would have pleased Jackson.
Warnke's resignation did not stop him from campaigning, but it did spark
speculation and solicitation. An article written in 1979 asking "Why Warnke Quit"
admitted that Warnke came "perilously close to the truth in his effort to get past the
committee."323 The author admitted that "for a Warnke fan it was a little disillusioning,"
but "perhaps this had to be done to get the job done, and didn't indicate any true backing
down." After all, Warnke maintained during the hearings that "I believe arms control is a
desirable objective…I am an enthusiast for making the effort."324 In Carter's SALT II
lobbying campaign, Warnke continued to speak on the theoretical vulnerability of
Minuteman and the adequacy of surviving submarines and bombers. As he had during
the hearings, Warnke maintained that neither could regain the elusive advantage in the
nuclear age even as he affirmed the need to deny Soviet superiority.325 In 1982 Warnke
received a solicitation from a sociologist seeking data on the "psychological forces
motivating government officials" to follow different policies in office from what they
previously publically espoused.326 With characteristic confidence Warnke replied that he
did not qualify for the study. 327 The effects of the controversy haunted his career
throughout his continuing campaigns and unfailing convictions.
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That Warnke's views were never really in doubt was further evidenced by the
opposition's campaign that continued after him. The very next month after the Senate
floor vote, the CPD published a pamphlet titled, "What Are the Soviets Up To?", the very
question Jackson had said during the hearings was what the national debate was all about.
Nitze, its author, warned that Russia was out to reduce America to impotence by the
instrument of coercion and the doctrine of fighting and winning a nuclear war. SALT
was no constraint to the Soviet drive for superiority. Nitze challenged Americans to
understand that "to ignore Soviet intentions and capabilities in erroneous conviction that
we have 'enough' to defend and time to strengthen is fatal."328 In the nuclear age, "enough
is not enough [without] efforts to keep pace," for there was "no alternative to vigilance
and a credible deterrent." This, he said, was the "prerequisite to negotiation of prudent
arms control."329
Just a few months later in June, Soviet historian Richard Pipes of the CPD was
still putting a warning label on the Warnke episode. In "Why the Soviets Think They
Can Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Pipes cited Warnke's interview with the New
Republic, wherein Warnke suggested that "we ought to be trying to educate [the Soviets]
to the real world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win."
Pipes countered with a deprecating reference to the comma controversy by saying, "even
after allowance has been made for Mr. Warnke's notoriously careless syntax, puzzling
questions remain." More pointedly he asked, why did Warnke chastise Americans rather
than Russians for what he regarded as a "primitive and unrealistic strategic doctrine?"
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Most important, "even if Mr. Warnke refuses to take Soviet strategic doctrine seriously, it
behooves us to take Mr. Warnke's views of Soviet doctrine seriously." This was because
he "will head our SALT II team" and his thinking reflected the "school of strategic theory
dominant in the United States." 330
Just as the competing campaigns had always been about, the dividing issue came
down to different approaches to negotiations based on opposing views of the nuclear
revolution and the Soviet threat. It was in this context of the debate between the two
schools of nuclear thought that the assumptions and doctrine of the negotiator mattered.
A caricature of Warnke he had received by a supportive cartoonist illustrated that
all knew the assumptions of the negotiator mattered. The caricature showed Warnke,
with blithe calculation, taking out missiles from the U.S. side of the strategic balance.
That it was from someone sympathetic to Warnke's views further confirms that Warnke's
views were never in doubt, which was precisely why they were so important for the
upcoming SALT II negotiations:
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Before the defense preparedness coalition held the treaty hostage to a change in
strategic thinking in 1979, they held the negotiator captive to the rising national debate in
1977. What Warnke stood for was never in doubt, but mustering enough votes against
him in order to strengthen Carter's negotiating hand by creating such doubts was, if
personally unfortunate, tactically genius. Jackson himself claimed the victory when he
stated that the hearings "marked an important turning point in the public debate over
national defense policy."331 His efforts in constructing a controversy set the media stage
necessary for a reformation in the discourse of strategic doctrine and a revived
commitment to modernization.

331

Quoted in Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 210.

109

The Strategic Revolution of Thinking in the Public Sphere
Paradoxically, the opposition's efforts against Warnke were as politically effective
as they were historically obscuring. The grassroots orchestration against Warnke may
have been "as phony as a three-dollar bill," but the vote was a test of principle.332 The
fuss over a comma may be indicative of the "trivialization of policy debates" in a
democracy,333 but it had strategic implications for doctrine and arms control that many
missed. In the words of Warnke's greatest defender Thomas Graham, a "valid debate
over philosophy degenerated into an ad hominem controversy over specifics." Yet also
in Graham's words, Jackson successfully seized on the "controversy to turn the Warnke
nomination into a full scale debate on strategic policy, as well as a referendum on SALT
II."334 It may have lost all pretense of a rational debate, but it stirred a national one that
enabled a broader campaign to continue. The credibility of the negotiator rather than the
deterrent may have dominated headlines, but without the vote against Warnke the
opportunity for shaping SALT would have been lost. The immediate politics may have
obscured the demonstration of assured destruction's inadequacy, but the significance of
superiority could never again be credibly denied.
Despite the petty and the personal campaign against him, Warnke was sworn in
on March 14, 1977. With his characteristic self-deprecating charm, Warnke said that
"I have a feeling that this ends one of the longest-running soap operas."335 Even more
significant for U.S. domestic politics, it was the beginning of a new era in strategic
thinking. The media, and later historians and commentators, easily noted the effort to
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control SALT II, but most missed the deeper concern about the inadequacy of U.S.
strategic thought in the public sphere. The teamwork behind the anti-Warnke effort
created a field of publicity ripe for the CPD's message to be heard, just in time for the
SALT II ratification debates of 1979.
The Armed Services Committee during the SALT II debates viewed their primary
role as reeducating the American people in strategic thinking. Still thinking that
"doctrines of mutual assured destruction, minimum deterrence, and assured destruction"
were enough, American citizens simply did not yet understand that "minimum deterrence
was not credible."336 Senator Nunn took it upon himself to ring the bell for an increase in
the defense budget. Stennis called for a bipartisan panel to select the next SALT
negotiator. Nitze and Nunn concluded that a rejection of SALT II and at least 50 votes
from Senators would best form a new consensus. Jackson, Nunn, and Tower sent a letter
to President Carter calling for a "fundamental change in strategic and military doctrine
and the resources to implement it," because a doctrine based on the destruction of
civilians was simply not credible.337 There would be no more talk of MAD. There would
be no treaty that restricted the United States to a MAD doctrine. The "ridiculous talk" of
minimum deterrence being enough, and of "overkill" being too much, would be exposed
as the "semantical flourishes" and rhetorical devices they were. 338 Together, theirs was a
clarion call for not only a renewed military buildup, but a new consensus that arms
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control would be pursued simultaneously with modernization.339 The old school was
gone, the new one was here.340
The campaign for a new consensus in strategic thinking and the call for a
reformation in deterrence theory continued into the 1980s, this time with institutional
support. Strategic theorists labeled the call for reform a "zealous attempt to discredit an
imaginary doctrine" and charges of a hegemonic "dovish liberalism clinging to MAD" a
revisionist political tactic.341 After all, the President has always had both military and
civilian targets to choose from, and the choice of surrender or holocaust was only a
"pencil and paper threat."342 Such writers had only the voice of a fading ink pen in
dovish journals as CPD members gained office appointments in the new Reagan
administration. Ever vigilant about an anemic deterrent based on impotent nuclear
ornamentation, if not the anemic faith based on "ceremonial deism," CPD co-founder
Eugene Rostow succeeded Warnke as director of the ACDA in 1978.343 For negotiator of
the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces talks, Reagan recruited Paul Nitze. Reagan even
asked both Jackson and the CPD if he could crib from their speeches and pamphlets.344
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Strategic doctrine slipped away from the rhetoric of assured destruction, to be
replaced by the language of war-fighting and counterforce. Carter's nomination of
Warnke provided an opportunity for fomenting a national debate on strategic doctrine,
while Reagan's election provided the opportunity to implement the renaissance in
thinking. Thanks to the deliberate construction of a controversy through the team effort
of Jackson, Nunn, and Nitze in 1977, Reagan presided over the official reversal of the
reification of MAD in the public consciousness after the defeat of SALT II. Craftily
combining the strategy of both schools, Reagan refused to poor mouth the U.S. deterrent
and was committed to both a war-fighting declaratory policy and strategic
modernization.345 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger engaged in a conspicuously
incautious rhetoric of nuclear war-fighting, and by the early 1980s, the language of warfighting was the new conventional wisdom of deterrence in the nuclear age.346
None of the sea change in strategic thinking and reformation in public rhetoric
was foreordained. Nor was the controversy Warnke's nomination provoked inevitable.
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Science Quarterly 94 no. 4 (1979-80), 631.
346
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Such thinking distorts how change occurs in a democracy; in this case, the evolution of
strategic doctrine in the public sphere.347 The sea change was the result of a deliberate
campaign for a new consensus between competing guiding concepts. Warnke's
nomination controversy was deliberately constructed for the purpose of gathering votes.
As this study argues, the desired blocking vote against confirmation would not have been
possible if Warnke had not changed his position and then denied doing so.
It was also not the nomination of an assured destruction apostle alone, but Carter's
pledge and Warnke's apostasy. Warnke's refusal to acknowledge the change gave cause
not to confirm Carter's confident pledge that once all considered what Warnke stood for,
they would approve him overwhelmingly. As Jackson clearly said, Warnke's "failure to
acknowledge he has revised his earlier dovish views on national security has shattered
my confidence…I cannot vote to confirm a man who has shattered my confidence that I
know where he stands, that I know what he believes."348 The strategic use of hearings
with the expectation of media coverage, and the tactic of creating doubt to gather votes,
was what made the nomination controversial. Warnke’s concession to Nunn on the stand
that assured destruction could not credibly deter the Soviets during a crisis was the
apostasy that shattered all confidence.
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The feigned doubt that all knew what Warnke stood for resulted in an immediate
tactical victory but has obscured history memory. The nomination is explained in the
literature as controversial simply by assuming Warnke's past record of opposition to
weapons and skepticism toward superiority made him an unacceptable negotiator.
Assumptions make incomplete scholarship. Jerry Sanders assumed the Warnke
controversy was only part of the post-Vietnam foreign policy disputes over the use of
force.349 In The Politics of Arms Control, Duncan Clarke understood that the opposition's
primary quarrel was with Warnke's philosophy and their main fear was his access to the
President, but he neglected the deeper doctrinal issues.350 Robert Strong assumed that
Warnke was simply not in the mainstream of thought. He recognized the issue of
superiority, but like Clarke, he failed to draw the necessary implications for strategic
doctrine.351 Patrick Glynn assumed that Jackson's exposure of Warnke's "antimilitary
views in detail" was sufficient to lay down markers for the SALT II fight. 352 Jackson's
own biographer William Kaufman highlighted Jackson's role in fortifying the opposition
after Warnke's uneventful glide through the "dovish Foreign Relations Committee," but
attributed his efforts, as did Sanders, to Post-Vietnam divisions on the use of force.353
Describing the anti-Warnke campaign as part of a broader effort to reinvigorate the
anticommunist coalition, Richard Gid Powers attributed the controversy to Nitze's
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"withering testimony" and Jackson's "grueling examination" of Warnke's past opposition
to weapons.354
Powers, Strong, Glynn, and Kaufman each found Jackson's list of 13 weapons
Warnke had opposed sufficient to indict him for being an ineffective negotiator and the
sole cause of his slim Senate passage.355 The literature's focus on that single exchange
while ignoring the rest demonstrated the inadequacy of their assumptions for what the
hearings were about.
Without a close examination of the hearings commentators have failed to
recognize the strategic use of the media and the tactical role of creating doubt about
Warnke's credibility that created the desired controversy. It was not alone what Warnke
symbolized that galvanized the opposition, but a personal tactic to win votes against him
that gave the opposition a public forum and policy clout. All have thus overlooked that
the tactical victory of gaining votes was a result not of Warnke's past record alone, or
even that he had changed. It was the deliberate construction of a controversy based on
Warnke's refusal to admit he had changed that made the nomination newsworthy and
prepared the media ground for the successful efforts of the CPD.
Thomas Graham was the only one to understand how the charge of Warnke's
dishonesty, more than even his private philosophy and public record, caused the
degeneration into an unfortunate if effective ad-hominem. It was those means that led to
the "full scale debate on strategic policy."356 Even Graham, though, did not grasp the
extent and scope of the team effort to use the hearings to foment a reformation in
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strategic thinking. Nor did anyone recognize the implications for U.S. strategic doctrine
behind questions merging the meaning of superiority and Warnke's credibility.
Chronological analysis of initial and subsequent reactions to the nomination and
in-depth analysis of both committee hearings demonstrate that Warnke's past record alone
was insufficient. By tracing the philosophical motivations behind the scenes over
previous years and the tactical development of the opposition once Carter announced
Warnke’s name, a different understanding emerges about the politics of negotiations and
strategy in a democracy. The effort was not just about controlling SALT, but about the
requirements of deterrence and the rhetoric of U.S strategic doctrine in the nuclear age. It
was about reversing talk of MAD as enough for a deterrent to prevent its caricature from
becoming reality under the terms of SALT II.
Warnke's nomination was the climax to a decade-long debate between two
competing schools of thought on how much was enough to deter the Soviets in both
rhetoric and capability. Behind the dramatic and personal politics of appointments and
ratification was the philosophical thread of the meaning of superiority and the political
implications of the counterforce imbalance. What better way to reverse the reification of
MAD in the public sphere than to get its greatest champion to admit on the stand its
insufficiency and the need for an equal counterforce capability? This was the
philosophical genius of Nunn that without Jackson's political effort to gather votes might
have gone unnoticed, and indeed has, both in the media's attention at the time and in
subsequent literature afterward. It was not Warnke's record but his stubborn
inconsistency in the hands of a skillful Washington lawyer and a sober Georgia Democrat
that changed the strategic tide. Jackson's strategy and tactics, by demonstrating the
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inadequacy of assured destruction and by gaining enough votes against Warnke to prove
he could block SALT II, established a counterforce doctrine and capability as the criteria
for a credible deterrent and a future treaty.
The decade-long debate between two schools of strategic thought culminated in
the reversal of the reification of MAD and a reformation in strategic thought. The
doctrinal debate did continue, but preparedness and war-fighting overtook restraint and
assured destruction as both conventional wisdom and declaratory policy in the public
sphere. Constructing a national controversy by creating doubt about the credibility of the
SALT negotiator was, if not the most unfortunate, at least one of the most creative ways
in U.S. history to educate the American people on the inadequacy of assured destruction
and to gain support for modernization simultaneously with arms control. This paper
resurrects the accomplishment of the preparedness school's efforts under the leadership of
Senatorial representatives Jackson and Nunn during the Warnke hearings of 1977. Their
deliberate construction of a controversy marked the end of a long-running soap opera but
the beginning of a new era in strategic thinking to prevent the caricature of MAD from
becoming a reality.
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